The risk of backdoors in encryption has changed since the last crypto wars.
With Huawei entering the 5G market, all ostensible law enforcement encryption backdoors now become de-facto Chinese communist party backdoors because of the pervasiveness of their equipment, and that nations interception capabilities.
The UK and Canada have approved Huawei to supply critical networks, and now end-to-end encryption on our personal devices is the only thing preventing interception by Beijing.
It also explains why the US president was so angry with Bojo over approving Huawei, because it means if the U.S. allows Huawei, it must also allow end to end encryption for citizens to protect themselves. The national security priority of mitigating that aggressive foreign interception capability for every business in the country should outweigh the special interest of law enforcement using victims groups as human shields.
That does not mean that the government has approved it. In fact, the telcos are freaked out right now that the government will say no and force the telcos to replace the Huawei stuff.
> With Huawei entering the 5G market, all ostensible law enforcement encryption backdoors now become de-facto Chinese communist party backdoors because of the pervasiveness of their equipment, and that nations interception capabilities.
How is this different from those backdoors being CIA/NSA backdoors, when that equipment was made by US vendors?
Nothing fundamentally changed. We should be building protocols that don't require us to trust the underlying network.
With Huawei entering the 5G market, all ostensible law enforcement encryption backdoors now become de-facto Chinese communist party backdoors because of the pervasiveness of their equipment, and that nations interception capabilities.
The UK and Canada have approved Huawei to supply critical networks, and now end-to-end encryption on our personal devices is the only thing preventing interception by Beijing.
It also explains why the US president was so angry with Bojo over approving Huawei, because it means if the U.S. allows Huawei, it must also allow end to end encryption for citizens to protect themselves. The national security priority of mitigating that aggressive foreign interception capability for every business in the country should outweigh the special interest of law enforcement using victims groups as human shields.