As long as they give pilots proper training, I'd actually rather fly on the recertified MAX than certain other Boeing planes.
They have gone though the whole plane with a fine toothed comb, Identifying any other potential problems. It will probably be the safest Boeing in the sky.
This whole MAX situation has made me very nervous about flying on the 787 (built in the same era) or the 737 NG (while it lacks MCAS, something else could theoretically put the stabilizer massively out of trim, and this whole situation has proven pilots have problems recovering from out-of-trim stabilizers)
Yep, the issue is the culture and the idea of "we are going to make subtle yet fatal changes to the plane, but not require pilots to learn about these changes" that's got everyone shook.
>They have gone though the whole plane with a fine toothed comb,
Are we sure this is happening? This is a modified airplane so they are checking the new addition but are they checking say the wheels or all the screws because some forces might be different and numbers changed and everything should be redone.
People have been talking about Boeing management grinding things down for years too; it's just that it finally had unignorable consequences. A lot of the difficulty with preventing and evaluating bad stuff is how long it takes for a big structure to rot.
They have only two flight computers - either of which are capable of crashing the plane. With only two its not always possible to know which is incorrect.
Regardless of how much you go over it you can’t fix a fundamentally broken design.
> They have gone though the whole plane with a fine toothed comb, Identifying any other potential problems. It will probably be the safest Boeing in the sky.
More like they've done the bare minimum to get the planes back in the air. The entire point of the plane is to avoid having to certify a new frame ie avoid doing exactly what you're implying they've done.
They've already recommended simulator time as a requirement to fly it. The shared type cert to avoid retraining is kind of moot.
The sad thing is this could be seen as a successful (in the Pyrrhic sense) business move by Boeing in that they were given an impossible goal, secured sufficient sales to airlines, and show all indications of being on the road to getting away with it if there are still sufficient people out there who are still willing to fly on one afterward.
Just gotta be willing to crack a few eggs, and cash in on that goodwill on occasion, yet the business churns on regardless.
It's a bit sickening to be honest. To be faced with what we're finding, and to show all indications of just moving on with business as usual.
It makes it hard to take anything seriously anymore. Cripes, I used to hang aerospace over my teams as a "you could be in a situation where I'd reject this work wholesale because you haven't convinced me you've thought it through, and I don't feel like killing people down the road."
Now the tables have turned... Even there, in what I thought was the last bastion of "it absolutely must be provably right", it seems that wasn't ever the case, or if it was, the rot has set in so badly as to leave it unrecognizable.
Leaves me feeling like a Diogenes, searching desperately for someone who isn't cutting irresponsible corners, and is dedicated to not just achieving the mission, but caring about how they do it.
Sorry, bit of a tangent there... But jeez. I figured it'd be bad. Not this bad though.
They have gone though the whole plane with a fine toothed comb, Identifying any other potential problems. It will probably be the safest Boeing in the sky.
This whole MAX situation has made me very nervous about flying on the 787 (built in the same era) or the 737 NG (while it lacks MCAS, something else could theoretically put the stabilizer massively out of trim, and this whole situation has proven pilots have problems recovering from out-of-trim stabilizers)