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> NAT itself does not provide any security

This is just arguing semantics. It's not "NAT itself", but a side effect of using it is that it requires deliberate effort to allow inbound connections to get to devices behind the router. This has many of the same effective security benefits as a firewall blocking inbound connections does.

Another way of saying this: the companies that make cheap, crappy routers can do the absolute bare minimum and not end up exposing internal devices to inbound internet traffic. So NAT provides security against the cheap, crappy router manufacturers.

With IPv6, the opposite is true: The router manufacturer has to do deliberate extra effort to block inbound connections, beyond just making the router "work". Will most router manufacturers do this extra effort and include a properly-configured firewall? Probably yes, especially if they don't want to get a terrible reputation for being insecure, which would (hopefully) eventually drive them out of business.

Will absolutely 100% of them always do this properly and never make a mistake? I wouldn't bet on it.




> It's not "NAT itself", but a side effect of using it is that it requires deliberate effort to allow inbound connections to get to devices behind the router.

Unless your router has UPnP port forwarding enabled—as most home routers do by default, since popular apps require it—in which case any device can open a hole in the firewall for whatever incoming traffic it wants. In this scenario NAT provides no additional protection beyond what the client device could provide for itself by simply not accepting incoming connections. To get security from a NAT setup you need to disable UPnP and manually configure any required port forwarding, which is at least as much effort as properly configuring an IPv6 firewall.

The right solution IMHO is to have a separate LAN/WLAN/VLAN for the untrusted IoT devices which rejects all inbound connections from the WAN (no UPnP support) as well as all outbound connections to the main LAN. Outbound connections to the WAN for updates or cloud-base control are permitted but logged; inbound connections from the main LAN are also permitted, to control the IoT devices locally. For the main LAN the router should only perform basic filtering for malformed or misrouted packets—ones with an external or multicast destination address or an internal source address, for example. Apart from that, devices on the main LAN are expected to handle their own security. Laptops, smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices are already required to handle this since they are routinely connected directly to untrusted networks.


In my experience upnp is no longer enabled by default (because: not secure). UDP hole punching usually works though.


My guess is the firewall functionality will stay as long as IPv4 and thus NAT remain relevant. Once IPv4 has faded into obscurity, we'll see the advent of IPv6-only routers that are really only dumb routers ... and wireless access points.


But that just isn't true. There is nothing in NAT that requires dropping inbound connections, so crappy router manufacturers might be failing to do so right now. If there is no firewall on the device, it won't prevent inbound connections, no matter how much NAT it does.


NAT66 is something real.




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