> They didn't know why the trim was kicking in in the first place
Unknown cause is symptomatic of runaway trim.
> The behavior did not present as a classic stabilizer runaway
How is runaway trim different from classic runaway trim? The trim was mysteriously turning on and trying to drive the nose into the ground. If that isn't runaway trim, I have no idea what runaway trim is.
BTW, I worked for 3 years on the Boeing 757 stabilizer trim gearbox. I know what runaway trim is. The cutoff switches are there as the last resort to stopping it, and they're prominently and conveniently on the center console for darn good reason.
> if pilots were really held to account for knowing the hardware they're operating
The point being, even if they knew what MCAS was, the corrective action is the exact same thing as in the instructions provided by Boeing, before and after the Lion Air crash.
> They did follow it actually
I'm glad you read it, but read it again. They did not follow it.
> clearly communicating the severity of the problem
Considering that it was an emergency mandatory notification, and the LA pilots had already crashed, I don't know how to harder communicate the severity. I'm not a pilot, but if I was a MAX pilot, I'd certainly not want to die the same way the LA pilots did, and I'd pay attention to an AD explaining how not to die.
But I do agree that evidently pilots needed more training to understand what to do about runaway trim, which they need to understand regardless of whether MCAS is causing the runaway trim or some other problem. There's a reason the runaway trim procedure is something that is a memory item, meaning pilots are supposed to know what to do about it without needing to consult the checklist. Training in this is clearly insufficient.
Unknown cause is symptomatic of runaway trim.
> The behavior did not present as a classic stabilizer runaway
How is runaway trim different from classic runaway trim? The trim was mysteriously turning on and trying to drive the nose into the ground. If that isn't runaway trim, I have no idea what runaway trim is.
BTW, I worked for 3 years on the Boeing 757 stabilizer trim gearbox. I know what runaway trim is. The cutoff switches are there as the last resort to stopping it, and they're prominently and conveniently on the center console for darn good reason.
> if pilots were really held to account for knowing the hardware they're operating
The point being, even if they knew what MCAS was, the corrective action is the exact same thing as in the instructions provided by Boeing, before and after the Lion Air crash.
> They did follow it actually
I'm glad you read it, but read it again. They did not follow it.
> clearly communicating the severity of the problem
Considering that it was an emergency mandatory notification, and the LA pilots had already crashed, I don't know how to harder communicate the severity. I'm not a pilot, but if I was a MAX pilot, I'd certainly not want to die the same way the LA pilots did, and I'd pay attention to an AD explaining how not to die.
But I do agree that evidently pilots needed more training to understand what to do about runaway trim, which they need to understand regardless of whether MCAS is causing the runaway trim or some other problem. There's a reason the runaway trim procedure is something that is a memory item, meaning pilots are supposed to know what to do about it without needing to consult the checklist. Training in this is clearly insufficient.