Probably true but not nafarious/corrupt. It's just human nature that if you watch something and it appears to be safe for long enough, you stop watching so closely.
It's also alkind of a paradox: the safer something appears to be, the more the safety is taken for granted and pushed to unsafe levels. C.f. the mortgage crisis or a million other examples.
From what data are you deriving this theory of inevitable entropy? The safety record of the airline industry overall does not appear to be declining or regressing. On the metric of commercial jet fatalities, 2017 was the safest year ever [0]. Or are you suggesting that the 737 MAX is the canary in the coal mine of an imminent era of airline disasters caused by complacency? Why is that more likely than the lobbying and bureaucratic changes documented in the article?
The commenter I replied to is asserting that a regression in safety is the natural order of things, and this is in response to article alleging systemic dysfunction on the part of Boeing.
I wanted to know what statistical basis he's working from, because the phenomenon he describes is not at all self-evident, not when airline safety has been solid for decades. That we just recently had the lowest annual crash-fatality count, in a decade that is arguably the safest decade in history of passenger travel, undercuts his claim. Unless he thinks the Boeing crashes are the harbinger of this inevitable safety regression.
I don't understand your comment if it's meant to be a rebuttal to me. The fact that after 2017's record safe year, hundreds of airliner passengers have in crashes involving new Boeing airliners, is support for the NYT article's thesis that Boeing is to blame. Not just, "shit happens as things get better".
I don’t have a particular opinion one way or the other on the idea that safety tends to revert. But given the past couple of years, I see why someone might think it is starting to revert.
Yes, people thinking there might be a regression in airline safety is the entire basis of the article. The main factors for that regression, particularly with respect to Boeing's record, is what's being debated.
That doesn't contradict my point. We push things to the edge of our tolerance for safety, and inevitably cross over sometimes. Only when something bad happens do we step back and focus on safety again.
That's not even necessarily bad, unless the bad thing that happens is so catastrophic that it destroys whatever safety record you previously had.
Your comment starts off with "Probably true but not nefarious/corrupt", in an article that alleges the safety regulatory process has been corrupted. Yes, I agree that feeling safe can lead to tragic complacency. I disagree with the notion that we should think of corporate culture problem like we do when someone gets into a fender-bender in boredom-inducing bumper-to-bumper traffic.
That is so true. From ancient times all the way through to today. People lose their sense of hazard.
From the idiot in their car, "Last time I drove I texted, and there was no problem...."
To ancient Babylon: the ruling class was partying the night they were invaded by Persia because they thought there was no way the Persians would ever be able to breach their walls. They had no sense of hazard.
Kind of reminds me of politicians today. They actually have no idea that their stupidity has a real chance of breaking things.
It's also alkind of a paradox: the safer something appears to be, the more the safety is taken for granted and pushed to unsafe levels. C.f. the mortgage crisis or a million other examples.