> What is "the reliability of the claim itself", if it is not the reliability of the method that is used to estalish that claim?

Wut?? If you can't see that "the reliability of the claim itself" =/= "the reliability of the method that is used to establish that claim", then I think we are done here because this would make for an insuperable disagreement. In the first phrase 'reliability' refers to the claim, and in the second it refers to the method. The claim and the method that is used to establish that claim are two different things.

> Yes, I have, over, and over, and over, even in my last post.

No you haven't. The method 'making-things-up' we already agree is unreliable, but you have not established that non-testable claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true. If I missed it, perhaps you could quote what you think has been so obviously stated that you needn't bother repeating it? I'll ask you to include an inequality proof and/or the percentages that have been calculated to reach/assert this conclusion.

> But the phrase "claim A is reliable" makes perfect sense without a "for X", simply as an expression of how likely the claim is to be true.

So you think these phrases are equal?: "claim A is reliable" = "it is likely claim A is true" = "the method that is used to establish claim A is reliable"

> Being a correct description of reality is what makes a claim useful for making predictions about the future behavior of that reality, and thus for influencing reality in such a way that a satellite does behave as intended/predicted.

And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?

> No, I am not, I am simply performing the empirical observation that is required to establish whether the claim is testable.

If you are performing said observation now to form a basis for your claim, did your claim not have a basis before?

> But ultimately, what counts is whether whoever is making the claim would accept those demonstrations as contradicting their claim.

So, whether a claim is falsifiable is subjective?

Also, are claims of the form "X is not falsifiable" falsifiable? If so, how might they be falsified?

> If you mean whether our senses generally produce a coherent picture of an outside world: That is falsifiable, in that we can cross-correlate different senses, between perceptions of the same sense over time, as well as between our own and others' perceptions.

Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> The claim and the method that is used to establish that claim are two different things.

Yes, of course they are! But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim", because reliability as an attribute of the claim itself is a category error. The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

If you take the claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", then what determines the "reliability of that claim" is how it was derived, there is no inherent reliability to just the claim itself. If someone rolled some dice to create that number, then that is a completely unreliable claim. If someone put 1632 tons of steel blocks on the bridge and it didn't fail, then that is at the very least a lot more reliable than rolling some dice. The fact that the exact same claim has completely different reliability, depending on how it was arrived at, should tell you that the reliability is actually a property of the process used to derive it, and not of the claim itself, even if that is how it is commonly phrased.

> The method 'making-things-up' we already agree is unreliable, but you have not established that non-testable claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true.

Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

Do you agree that non-testable claims are indistinguishable from claims arrived at by making them up?

> So you think these phrases are equal?: "claim A is reliable" = "it is likely claim A is true" = "the method that is used to establish claim A is reliable"

Seems sensible to me!

> And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?

Oh, sure, of course they are! I had understood your question to mean that you thought that the specification of a particular application was missing, or something along those lines. But yes, that they are reliable for such use is the implication, of course.

> If you are performing said observation now to form a basis for your claim, did your claim not have a basis before?

Really, I have implicitly switched the claim, simply to enable a productive discussion.

The problem is that "god" is a word that is used to refer to so many different and mutually contradictory concepts that demonstrating any claim for all of those concepts can be a lot of work, and often is even impossible because someone will come along and claim that god is the sun or something (and under that definition, obviously, god does exist, but probably isn't Jesus, say). So, before, I made a claim that is generally true for the vast majority of the god concepts that people have, just for a wide variety of reasons, depending on the specific concept.

But explaining how the claim is true for most/all god concepts is a lot of work--and also probably not the most useful thing to do, when you, presumably, have a specific god concept in mind, so focusing on that seems more productive than getting lost in ideas that you may not agree with anyway. Which is why I switched from the general claim to a more specific claim that's presumably more relevant to you.

> So, whether a claim is falsifiable is subjective?

No, it's not that the falsifiability is subjective, but rather that what ultimately matters is the falsifiability of what you actually think, not of what someone else interprets your statements to mean. If someone says "water boils at 100 °C", you would presumably agree that that is a statement that implies certain possibilities to falsify it, and as such the statement would qualify as a falsifiable claim, based on how the English language is generally understood to work. But if you were to demonstrate liquid water at 200 °C to whoever is uttering that sentence and they would still keep making the same statement, then their internal model that they try to express as "water boils at 100 °C" is still untestable, and that is still a problem.

> Also, are claims of the form "X is not falsifiable" falsifiable? If so, how might they be falsified?

By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

> The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

> Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

> Seems sensible to me!

Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

=====================

> By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

Are you asking me?

=======

0) According to you: If X is falsifiable, then X "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all".

===

1) If the claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable, then "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Substitution 0)

2) According to you: The claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable"?". (ASSUMPTION)

3) Therefore: The "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Conditional Elimination from 1, 2)

=======

In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

=====================

>> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

> You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

> Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

I'm not sure what you are getting at?! If you think I should be objecting to you using the word "correct", because that is a property of the claim itself and not dependent on the method used to arrive at it: Sure, assume that I object to that. But it seemed to me that that wasn't relevant to what you were actually asking about, namely, whether reliability of a claim implies potential usefulness of that claim _for_ some further purpose.

> Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

I really don't understand why you are asking this. I already explained why the notion of reliability of the claim itself doesn't make any sense/is a category error. And I suppose that you would agree that people do use phrases like "claim X is reliable", and that it is usually perfectly understandable what they mean by that. Also, under the interpretation that I suggested, you generally do understand what people are trying to tell you when they use such a phrase, while avoiding the obvious logical nonsense that follows if you assume that reliability is a property of the claim itself.

Now, it may well be true that many people who use such a phrase have never really thought through what exactly they mean by that, and thus have never made a conscious decision of whether they are using one definition or the other. But that isn't a reason to think that they likely intend to use a definition that leads to contradictions.

It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

> If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

Well, while that is kinda true, it's also not really particularly relevant in this context? Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

The other problem with that perspective is that it counts redundant claims more than once. Like, if some measurement of X could give the result 0, 1, or 2, then "X is not 0" is the same claim as "X is 1 or 2", just phrased differently. So, if you want to get a useful result, you have to rather compare non-redundant claims of the same structure and at the same resolution. If you do that, you notice that there in particular are tons of claims about numerical values, and that there is an infinite number of either discrete values of or equal-sized intervals that you could plug into any such claim to make up new claims--but for any particular measurement, only one of those infinitely many possible values or ranges will correspond to reality, and almost all claims that you could make up this way will be wrong.

If you don't find that convincing, I guess we might also replace "made-up claims are almost all false" with "made-up claims are no more likely to be true than chance", as you seem to already be agreeing with that? I don't think I drew any conclusions that require the stronger claim, so we might as well go with a lower lower bound instead.

> Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

> Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes? Though I don't understand why you mention that the claim is true, as that makes no difference!? In the scenario you are describing, there is no reason for anyone to believe that it is true, because all they know is that someone made it up.

> Are you asking me?

No, I am telling you--though I wondered why you asked the original question, as the possibility to falsify that claim seems kinda ovious!?

> In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

So?

> Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

Could we maybe transfer this to a different scenario where it isn't as easy to get confused by intuitions? Like, assume there exists a robot with a bunch of sensors. And let's assume you can remote-control this robot, and remotely read what its sensor inputs measure. Now, with this robot you could do what I described above: You could check all those sensors for consistency. And maybe you could somehow communicate with other robots and check for consistency with the readings of their sensors. None of that guarantees that the robot (and thus you through it) sees "real reality", for all you know, it was built with all sensor connectors linked up to a computer that generates fake sensor signals from a simulation running on that computer, including a simulation of the stimuli from interacting with other (actually simulated) robots. But you said that that wasn't what we were talking about. So, if we aren't talking about that, then we are talking about actual sensors!? Is your question whether this guarantees that the sensors are free of any defects? (Well, no?) Or whether it is guaranteed that the robot itself can not be defective? (No?)

Or ... what else? I really don't understand what you are asking here.

Anything you've said with > ... reliability is a property of the claim itself ...

I have never stated that I thought this. You may have thought my wording implied that, but that has never been what I was getting at. You've incorrectly inferred this on your own, so I never addressed any statement you made regarding it as it was getting away from the point. But clearly since you've struggled to wrap your head around that, I've now spelled it out for you.

> It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

No, I've been getting at asking why you think people mean "the method used to arrive at claim X is reliable" rather than something like "claim X can be trusted for use", when "claim X is reliable" is stated.

Your stance is also noticeably less coherent when it is considered that "claim X" can't be replaced by "this wrench" or "this car" and not lack significant ambiguity ("the method used to arrive at this car is reliable"). Where as if you were to replace "claim X" in "claim X can be trusted for use" for "this car", you'd get "this car can be trusted for use".

What you've done is equivocate, using "reliability" differently for claims versus how it is used in all other areas. In particular using it in reference to X on one hand and in reference to the method that derived X on the other, which has nothing like a mechanical analog to help indicate that your usage is one that matches the usage of anyone else outside of your own head.

> Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

Then perhaps what you mean is: Made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue than claims that are not made up. If that is the case are you asserting that "Any method that doesn't make up claims has a greater probability of being true than any methods that do make up claims"?

> Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes?

So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

> So?

According to you: The assertion of any claim that is not falsifiable is not warranted.

This has no certain basis, by your definitions. As a result this means that no claim should be ignored just because it is currently considered to not be falsifiable.

Another question comes to mind. Say you claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm". You then perform a test on water at "1 atm", and it boils at 100°C. Having falsified the original claim, according to you, you can now say "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm".

After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

> Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable". To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

> So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

Imagine I came to you and told you that I had determined that some bridge could bear 1632 tons, and that I had determined that by rolling dice, one for each digit. You don't know anything else about this bridge. Would you say that my claim is

(a) likely to be true

(b) likely to be false

(c) you have no clue how likely it is to be true or false

?

> This has no certain basis, by your definitions.

So? I didn't claim I had a certain basis. Do you have a certain basis for any belief? And if not, why are you bringing this up?

> After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

> That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable".

But that isn't self-evidently true, it's simply tautologically true. "What we perceive is what we perceive". Duh?

As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

And far as "the reality we perceive" is concerned, it's a trivial, tautological statement, not some insight about the world. That statement would even be true if we didn't perceive anything.

> To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

Which you can't because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false.

> Would you say that my claim is... ?

And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine? You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false. What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

> I didn't claim I had a certain basis.

So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

So, by your words, every falsifiable claim is not falsifiable with certainty, because any claim X that states the falsification of some falsifiable claim Y can be falsified.

> As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

How do you know this with certainty?

As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

> And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine?

Your line of questions seemed to be missing the point, which is why I tried to make things easier by asking you how you would understand language in this context.

> You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false.

Nope.

> What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

No, I am not equivocating those, those just are the same thing, and I am almost certain that you also use language in this way, even though it seems like maybe you aren't aware of it. Which is why I asked you that one simple question, to see whether you actually do.

> So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about. Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

> How do you know this with certainty?

Just remove "certainly". The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any. If you have some, feel free to share it.

> As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

Correct. Which is why I am not making that claim.

> I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about.

So apparently you are uncertain that you've just stated "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about"... lol, wow.

Haha, are you certain you won't answer any further questions about whether you are certain about something until I show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about? If not, are you certain that you are not certain? If so, well then now you know there is something you can possibly be certain about. If not, are you certain?

> Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

Smh, tsk tsk. I do apply it to other things. At the moment, however, we are dealing with your "uncertain" claims, a burden which is evermore appearing to be too much for you, especially now, given that you have now revealed that you've not intended to say anything with certainty. Perhaps, for all future claims you make, it would serve us well if you included wording that indicates your uncertainty.

> Just remove "certainly".

If you're going to remove certainty from all of your claims, then we have reached the end of our discussion. I'm content with you not being certain of the claim "Religion is incompatible with science". You may feel that one can't be certain of anything, but it is certain that you can't be certain of that.

> The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any.

Well according to you, you are not certain that you doubt it. In addition, by your own expectations of uncertainty, you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it), and, to continue, you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it)), and you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it))), and so on...

Oh, and if you want to replace all certainty with likelihood, as in stating that "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" to highlight your uncertainty of the claim "Religion is compatible with science", then the claim "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" would also be uncertain. This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above. So... have fun with that.

Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

> I do apply it to other things.

So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

> This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above.

Except there is no such thing. There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so. There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything. And as such, you are simply demanding that I make an unjustified claim because that claim is an assumption that you want to make, and you maybe will refuse to engage unless I make that claim.

But that is not a problem that I can solve. I hold the position that absolute certainty is unjustified, and I am willing to help you understand that perspective if you are interested. You can either drop your assumption for the sake of the discussion, so you can maybe understand how my perspective makes sense, or you can insist that I should be sharing your assumption, which certainly will not allow you to understand my perspective.

In particular, you may want to take another close look at the examples that you used, apparently to try and construct contradictions from my statements. What you maybe want to pay attention to is whether those are actually contradictions (that is, self-inconsistent). It seems to me that many really just demonstrate that what I said contradicts the assumption of (the need for) absolute certainty. Which I'll readily admit they do. But that is not inconsistent, because that is not an assumption that I share. As such, they are expressions of how hard you find to accept what I said, which is fair--but they do not show a problem in my argument or reasoning.

> Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

I don't mean "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise" when I say certain. I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

> So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

> There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so.

Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

> There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything.

Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness: "Which you can't [with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false] because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false."

> I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

OK!

> Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

Well, possibly you have, just trying to avoid confusion.

Could you give one example of such a claim? (Yes, I understand you might already have mentioned one, I just want to be sure I am not misrepresenting you.)

> Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

Exactly! But note: "less basis" does not mean "no basis". Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does. The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

> Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

Well, yes, of course it is!? Are you saying that you have never made what you now consider errors in your logical thinking, where you were convinced that you came to a conclusion through correct logical reasoning and later came to the conclusion that you were wrong about that?! And if that has happened to you (I mean, it happened in this thread, so I assume you will agree that it has happened to you?), then how would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct? And if you you can't distinguish those, how would not all of logic be suspect, at least just enough to not justify labeling it as absolutely certain?

And maybe more importantly: How is that relevant to our conversation? Either we agree on some claim or argument or we don't, how does it make any difference whether either one of us is certain about it?!

> This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness:

I don't see how, could you explain?

> Could you give one example of such a claim?

It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way. Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

> Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does.

Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

> The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had. Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

> How would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct?

By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

> How is that relevant to our conversation?

Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation. Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

> I don't see how, could you explain?

Your statement "There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything", expresses a lack of certainty in all claims, which includes tautological claims and claims of awareness, "awareness" being comparable to "senses".

If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false. You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

> It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way.

Hu?

1. People at least constantly claim that they are certain about self-contradictory things (that they themselves don't realize are/don't see as self-contradictory), so ... evidently, it is possible to be certain about that!?

2. What does truthfulness have to do with any of this? How does me being uncertain of a claim make it impossible for either the claim to be true or for me to assert it!?

> Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

So, how did you exclude the possibility that there is a flaw in the logical reasoning that we both haven't realized yet?

> Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

So? All you seem to be saying here is "but then you can't be certain!". Yeah, duh? The fact that some reasoning conflicts with an assumption that you want to make does not invalidate the reasoning, it just means that it conflicts with that assumption.

> It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had.

Well, that is the claim that you are making.

> Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

So? (see above)

> By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

And how would you distinguish those cases where you have correctly ruled out a possibility from those cases where you have mistakenly ruled out a possibility?

> Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation.

Why?

How do claims of certainty possibly add anything to a conversation? One side makes a claim/argument, the other either agrees or doesn't. If both sides agree, that claim can be used for building further arguments on it, which, again, the other side either agrees to or doesn't. If the other side doesn't agree, you have to explain your position based on things they previously agreed to, to work out whether you can get them to agree, or to possibly revise their positions on stuff they previously agreed upon, or to possibly revise your own position to get to an agreement on a different claim.

How does certainty play any role in this? Does asserting "but I am certain" ever help with convincing anyone (who obviously isn't certain of the same thing, or they wouldn't be disagreeing)? Does it add anything when you agree with someone, and then you also both say "and we are also both certain of this!"? Does it have any use if someone agrees with you on a claim, but you insist that they also agree to the claim that they are certain about that claim, or else you will act as if they didn't agree with you on the first claim either?

As far as I can see, knowing anything for certain isn't just not necessary for most conversation, it's also completely useless. Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

> Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

So, if there are in fact no reasons to think otherwise, then that is a non-starter for any conversation?!

> If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false.

No, that is just you assuming certainty to demonstrate certainty, i.e., circular reasoning. Yes, if I assume that I can determine with absolute certainty that a given claim is tautological, and that I can determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts, then ... I could determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts. But that's just a very convoluted way to express an assumption, not a demonstration of anything.

Tautologies are, by definition, true, and I agree with you on that. So what is the point of demanding that I also agree that I could not possibly be mistaken in my understanding of the definition of "tautology", that I could not possibly ever end up considering a false statement to be a tautology, that I could not possibly ever be wrongly convinced that a statement that is in fact tautological could be demonstrated to be false? Why do you require that I declare that I will not change my mind on what the common definition of "tautology" is, no matter what evidence you show me (that is: that I declare that this is "beyond doubt")? What good could possibly come from that, even if we ignore all the problems that could come from such a stance?

> You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

No, I am simply open to the idea that what I think are logical contradictions are in fact not.

> If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

So? Again and again, you make these statements that lead to contradictions with the assumption of absolute certainty ... but why would you do that if you want to convince someone who doesn't share that assumption?

> Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

===

To set things in order:

You claim that "Religion is incompatible with science" because, as you've claimed, they contradict in stating what is or is not warranted regarding the assertion of falsifiable claims.

Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims. Moreover, when I pushed you on this regarding a specific claim you provided, asking "Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?", you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The issues with that aside, if I where to answer that question similar to the way you answered one of mine...

"

s> "After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?"

z> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

"

... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Your argument also fails on the grounds of not having a coherent use of the term "falsifiable":

You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

===

You have less basis for your claim "Religion is incompatible with science" than you have of the the claim "Some claims can be known with certainty".

Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

> Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

I didn't ask you to be justified in being certain, I asked you to demonstrate that you are (or anyone else is) justified in being certain. Being justified seems to be useless, demonstrating that you are justified is not.

> Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims.

Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

> [...] you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

> ... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Which just demonstrates that you don't understand what falsifiability is?

What I describe is a very specific observation: A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

What you desribe is ... nothing of the sort? You give zero criteria by which to decide whether the experiment has failed.

> You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

> By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Is there some negation or some quantifier wrong in this? I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

> Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. Certainty is not a requirement for falsification. Falsification is not about making certain that a claim is false. Seriously, just stop assuming that anyone but you is demanding certainty for anything. All these arguments of yours boil down to "but then you can't be certain!". Yes, DUH! I have told you again and again that I do not share this assumption of yours, so, please, stop making that assumption. Either justify the claim, or work without it. If your argument only makes sense under the assumption that someone demands certainty, it is not a relevant argument for this discussion. If your argument shows that my position is inconsistent with absolute certainty, that only shows that my position is consistent in that regard.

> Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

That smells like essentialism?

I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?

"Yes, DUH!" he said as though he were certain, contradicting his own position, a position he's not completely sure exists.

No, that is purely your invention. There is no contradiction with my own position, and there is no certainty involved, nor is certainty needed.

All you are doing is that you are refusing to agree with claim A in the context of this discussion unless I agree to unrelated claim B, even though you otherwise do agree with claim A.

You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.

The fact that you can willfully claim that you don't agree with something you actually do agree with unless I give in to some demand of yours is not an argument, that is just destructive behaviour. If you are unwilling to follow a logical argument for the only reason that the person making the argument does not claim certainty, that is willfully undermining the conversation, and is exclusively your responsibility to address.

The Final nail:

You agree with the following claim: The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm".

Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality, then, in order to be warranted, you'd need to have a specific observation that would falsify the claim "The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim 'water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm'". But now the claim, that whatever observation you may describe would falsify the aforementioned, would also need to have an observation that would falsify it.

Any claim that some claim is falsified by some observation will also have to have a observation that falsifies that claim. Thus leading to an infinite regression (have fun showing your position is warranted when you have to detail an unending list of observations), circular regression (we both agree circular reasoning is not reasonable), or a first claim that is not falsifiable.

> There is no contradiction with my own position, and there is no certainty involved, nor is certainty needed.

How do you know there is no certainty involved? How do you know certainty is not needed? If you are not certain, why not say "is likely" instead of "is"? ("There is likely no contradiction with my own position", "there is likely no certainty involved", "Religion is likely incompatible with science", etc.)

> You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.

Logic works, your's doesn't, particularly because you are framing your conclusion using terms of certainty while also refusing to think that anything can be known with certainty.

Do you have a reason for not assuming something, even your own existence, can be known with certainty? What I've gathered from your previous replies would indicate that your main reason could be phrased as "there is no way to verify that my perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'".

More nails for your argument's proverbial coffin... ;)

===

> Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

"Yes, DUH!", hence the question. What indicates to you that making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion?

> The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

So you are not relying on me to describe to you a very specific observation that I would "accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that [I] believe in", in order to answer my question "How has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim"?

> Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

We already selected the position "God exists". You've yet to demonstrate that it is not falsifiable. You are merely dodging the question with "It just is!"/"Because I said so!" like responses.

> A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

Measuring the temperature of the water vapor at 150 °C coming off of liquid water at 149.9999 °C doesn't falsify that claim if you haven't checked lower temperatures. If you haven't checked every temperature from -273.15 °C to 150 °C at every possible precision, then you may have missed some other temperature at which it boils. More over, if the claim was "water does not boil only at 150 °C in 1 atm" vs "150 °C+ in 1 atm", then you'd also have to check every temperature at every possible precision above 150 °C to falsify that claim.

> You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

Is it possible to make a tautological claim about reality?

> I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

If you can always potentially falsify claim A which is the falsification of claim B, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been falsified. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been falsified, then it is not actually falsifiable, because if it were actually falsified then there would no longer be any potential for it to be not actually falsified. For a claim to not actually be falsifiable, when it is said to be falsifiable, is a contradiction.

In other words:

If you can always have the potential to show that claim A is false, which is a claim that states claim B is false, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false, then it cannot actually be shown to be false, because if it were actually shown to be false then there would no longer be any potential for it to have not actually been shown to be false. For a claim to not have the potential to actually be show as false, when it is said to have the potential to be show as false, is a contradiction.

> That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. ...

No, it is a problem resulting from your use of the word "is".

> I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?

In what context could some existing person be certain that they exist and be wrong?

===

Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality:

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the first premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the second premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the conclusion of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "the claim 'water only boils at 100 °C+ in 1 atm' is falsifiable"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "'formal truths' are not about reality"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "claims about reality must be falsifiable to be warranted"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "there is no way to verify that perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'"?

===

Have fun!