The strongest argument against free will doesn't have to do with determinism (and I agree with Christian List that looking at lower levels is a category error). Even if you chuck out determinism, you still can't say what free will is a supposed to _be_. It just evaporates while you try to examine it, no matter what sort of framework you put up around it.
That's the case for many abstract notions no one seems to agree on. Art, culture, nation, justice... No one really agrees on what they're supposed to be, only on single instances. Doesn't make the more encompassing abstraction any less real or useful.
No, I don't think that's it. Art, justice, etc, have constituent parts. People disagree, but there's lots of stuff in those boxes. When I turn my minds eye to free will, there's nothing there.
> Even if you chuck out determinism, you still can't say what free will is a supposed to _be_. It just evaporates while you try to examine it, no matter what sort of framework you put up around it.
I don't see why. Free will is a choice made for our own reasons that isn't coerced by another actor's will.
No doubt there are nuances to this when you get into the details, but it's a big leap to say it simply evaporates. We can clearly see it doesn't because we can make meaningful distinctions between the behaviour of people and that of rocks.
>I don't see why. Free will is a choice made for our own reasons that isn't coerced by another actor's will.
This is exactly why free will evaporates. Your decision making apparatus and the factors that go into your choice are a given. Multiply yourself and the situation by a million, you will always make the same decision using the same apparatus and the same factors, unless there is a random element, but that is random, not free. You're not constrained, but you are, at a very basic level, determined.
> Multiply yourself and the situation by a million, you will always make the same decision using the same apparatus and the same factors, unless there is a random element, but that is random, not free.
The Frankfurt cases debunked the principle of alternate possibilities as necessary for free will. I suggest reading my other comment where I go into further details: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19928438
The Frankfurt cases addresses your thought experiment. My comment fills in the blanks of how we can define free will without relying on the principle of alternate possibilities which the Frankfurt cases debunked (and also explains the difference between the various conceptions of "free will" that typically cause this confusion).
A lot of this is about moral philosophy, which doesn't interest me. I'm more interested in causality. But I don't see why determinism would mean you can't be held morally responsible, or "free will" would be necessary for morality to work. Sunni Muslims don't believe in free will, and certainly believe in moral responsibility.
> A lot of this is about moral philosophy, which doesn't interest me
That's what the free will debate in philosophy is about: whether there's a coherent conception of free volition that can justify holding an actor morally responsible for their choices.
The philosophical question is the context of "free will" discussed by the article. Other notions of free will may or may not overlap, as I described in my other comment.
> Sunni Muslims don't believe in free will, and certainly believe in moral responsibility.
Interesting claim, but from what I've just read they do believe in free will, but they also believe that God knows all outcomes, ie. determinism/predestination. In other words, they are Compatibilists.
>That's what the free will debate in philosophy is about: whether there's a coherent conception of free volition that can justify holding an actor morally responsible for their choices.
Well, I don't care about that question. I'm interested in whether free will exists as a matter of [meta]physics, prior to questions of morality.
Err replying to myself here... I just had the personal revelation that this could also be a strong argument _for_ free will. If we can't properly examine is by breaking it down, it might be said to be a fundamental property (like consciousness, perhaps?).
