>A cynical man could be inclined to think that with this change, they casually removed a possibility of pilots/airlines realizing the existence of MCAS: "we have thrown off the right switch to unlink the autopilot from the trim motor and there is still something making automated stabilizer inputs, what could it be?"
It's worse actually. They've taken a procedure, and are raising it on a pedestal as if to say "See, this is how a 737 flies! It's all right there! You can stop looking now!"
It's as if they don't want anyone to realize that this plane simply does not fly like a 737. Which is what has been getting shouted from the rooftops since the first disaster.
What I find wickedly ironic was it was exactly Boeing's insistence to "not inundate" flight pilot's with technical information, and give an accurate accounting of the vast differences in the minute details of the aircraft that created the problem.
Someone looked at the checklist item of "both stab trim switches to cutout", didn't look into what that actually meant, and changed the plane to fit the procedure. This change cost extra effort. Instead of using the same switches and wiring they were using before, they actually degraded the granularity of control of the plane to hide the differences.
I can't imagine the thought process at the time. Be nice to see what the documentation turns up.
It's fair to recognize this is not entirely Boeing's fault either: it was the airline industries that don't want to re-train their pilots and wanted this type of plane (American Airlines was specifically keen on getting Boeing to manufacture this plane [1]), so they were kind of told "we want you to make exactly $this, otherwise we switch to Airbus".
From AA’s point of view they were passing on working and proven airplanes from Airbus for something not even on the drawing board yet. For them to agree to this Boeing had to offer them an amazing deal.
I don’t blame AA for taking a good offer. They did not force Boeing to do this.
Given. However, in Engineering, it is totally expected that when you start getting into areas that sketchy, you say "No. The best I can do is this. I'm sorry."
Instead, Boeing saw dollar signs, and threw caution and people's lives, and years of good will to the winds.
The people making the decisions weren't engineers. They were managers. And they just passed the buck to the engineers who actually had to go along with it to keep their jobs.
And I know people will try yo claim that it was the engineers fault and they should have just refused and gotten fired. But engineers have mortgages and have to work for a living. They can't afford to career suicide just because their boss is being unreasonable.
The people who made the decisions should be held accountable. That means the CEO should actually go to prison.
There's also a lot more understanding of the corporate and political culture against whistleblowers, so even engineers or managers with good morals would not risk the backlash of endless lawsuits or corporate shaming. We should add this to the list of contributing factors given that a few whistleblowers have only come forward after-the-fact.
It's worse actually. They've taken a procedure, and are raising it on a pedestal as if to say "See, this is how a 737 flies! It's all right there! You can stop looking now!"
It's as if they don't want anyone to realize that this plane simply does not fly like a 737. Which is what has been getting shouted from the rooftops since the first disaster.
What I find wickedly ironic was it was exactly Boeing's insistence to "not inundate" flight pilot's with technical information, and give an accurate accounting of the vast differences in the minute details of the aircraft that created the problem.
Someone looked at the checklist item of "both stab trim switches to cutout", didn't look into what that actually meant, and changed the plane to fit the procedure. This change cost extra effort. Instead of using the same switches and wiring they were using before, they actually degraded the granularity of control of the plane to hide the differences.
I can't imagine the thought process at the time. Be nice to see what the documentation turns up.