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Why does Mozilla do this? Same with removing the option to not update. Why not let users choose (in the case of update maybe with an about config setting)?


Because (stable) users are dumb, are easily manipulated and can't be trusted. Thus the mothership has to be in control for the greater good. They also argue that enduser computers are already effectively "compromised" from a mozilla perspective because adware runs installers with admin privs and thus could insert things into the program folders. Thus anything the user can do adware could do too and therefore they can't give them any choice.

They put it in nicer words though.

To their credit, you can opt out but only if you switch to dev edition, nightly or custom builds, which either is a one-way road since downgrades corrupt profiles or tedious because you don't receive auto-updates.

But what they should really have done is allowing additional signing roots. Even secure boot does that.


This sounds like a threat model and mitigation developed by a college intern.

How, exactly, is a user land application going to protect itself from modification by a computer admin? I think DRM, anti-virus, and os vendors everywhere would love an answer to this.

This threat model completely fails to account for live patching, trusted cert root modification, dll hooking, etc. Either the Mozilla security folks are incompetent / winging it, or this isn't the real reason.


Here's the official reason in case you don't trust my grim representation of it: https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2015/04/15/the-case-for-exte...


I get the ostensible justification, but attacking this way requires the user to dig into the obscure dev settings and load an xpi from outside the browser[1]. Is there even one case of a user compromised that way?

[1] or at least they could have allowed that as a compromise


I updated my previous comment. They say there exist crapware installers that use elevated privileges that do inject stuff into the browser and that's why we can't have nice things, yes.

But I disagree with their value tradeoffs. They want to add a little "protection" - which is really flimsy since there is no privilege separation - for users who already compromised their systems with adware at the expense of the freedom of everyone else.


I'm totally fine with software already running on my machine being able to install addons into my browser. It can also already install a keylogger and record the screen, what's the big deal?


Are you fine with calling “editing of crypto certs” a study? And do you endorse all Orwellian doublespeak, or just this instance?


Because they don't want trojans to hijack the browser. If the user can change the signing preference, any application can.


It is not possible for a user land application to prevent root processes from hijacking / modifying it. Such protection requires the protecting mechanism to run at a higher level of trust / security ring than the attacker.


Yes, the sibling comment and thread already brought that up.




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