I think people are generally good at 2nd order thinking, and thinking within complex systems with multiple causes, effects and subsequent effects. Especially so if we're immersed and experienced in a field.
We are bad at thinking this way in groups, relatively. We're especially bad when these groups are political. If we're deciding on arming rebels, the political dynamics are the 2nd order effects that dominate thinking, not the war... especially if it's a small foreign war that's unlikely to reach home.
The rebel field commander has no problem recognising these strategic dynamics.
>> I think people are generally good at 2nd order thinking
>> We are bad at thinking this way in groups, relatively.
Wow! This seems to answer a long-standing question I have had. I think I can now work out the mathematics of this, given appropriate amount of time. I think this is it! Thanks.
Stupid 1st order: Making jails as bad as possible will deter criminals which will make everyone safer.
Good 2nd order: That doesn't work. How about we try rehabilitation and cutting the social and economic causes of crime?
Evil 2nd order: You're a snowflake. Of course it works. [I know it's nonsense, but I'm going to lie to you for profit.] How are the shares in my prison services company doing today?
Stupid 1st order: See! The authority agrees! We're right!
3rd order: So... how do we deal with the evil 2nd order people?
Everyone else: Why are you creating imaginary problems? Let's get back to the real issues!
But the “stupid first order” proposition is correct. If our policy was to brutally torture people for even the most minor infractions, and we enforced it very well, no one would ever commit a crime unless they were extremely confident that they could get away with it.
The problem is that this “cure” would be much worse than the disease.
Sometimes I wonder if people are actually really good at thinking in groups but the thought process is just too terrifying and different from what we could understand as individuals
We are bad at thinking this way in groups, relatively. We're especially bad when these groups are political. If we're deciding on arming rebels, the political dynamics are the 2nd order effects that dominate thinking, not the war... especially if it's a small foreign war that's unlikely to reach home.
The rebel field commander has no problem recognising these strategic dynamics.