Fixing an "aerodynamic" problem with a "software" solution is already cutting over to a different problem domain and it will lead to unforeseen circumstances. What can go wrong, will go wrong.
People at Boeing who made decisions for this project whether it is a team lead or a test lead or a project manager or a sales exec or a CEO; are all equally blamed for this. These deaths are on their conscience.
>Fixing an "aerodynamic" problem with a "software" solution is already cutting over to a different problem domain and it will lead to unforeseen circumstances.
I have a hard time parsing this. A modern airliner is a conglomerate of physical aerodynamic design, electronics and software. I am not convinced that something like MCAS is so out of the norm from modern aviation design principles.
>People at Boeing who made decisions for this project whether it is a team lead or a test lead or a project manager or a sales exec or a CEO; are all equally blamed for this.
Maybe. Or maybe there is no actual underlying problem. Or maybe the problem has nothing to do with the MCAS system. Let's wait a little and see how it plays out.
People at Boeing who made decisions for this project whether it is a team lead or a test lead or a project manager or a sales exec or a CEO; are all equally blamed for this. These deaths are on their conscience.