Are you saying it's a public consciousness thing, then?
When I vote, it is my understanding that when I stuff my paper ballot into the box (or sometimes even just hand it over to someone), I am forced to trust the staff to account for my vote. Personally, I don't feel like I'm any more protected against bad actors by using pencil-and-paper.
The only truly-auditable solution I can think of is to have everyone make their vote public, but that is obviously not a reasonable solution.
There are eyes on your ballot and the voting urn, and there may be observers from different political parties present at your polling location, also keeping eyes on the ballots and the urns.
At your polling place, you count the number of ballots going into each urn, and you count the number of ballots coming out of each urn when voting is over. You do a preliminary counting of the ballots, and then they get put back into the urns, that are then sealed, and sent off to some central place for a second counting.
So at every step there are multiple eyes on all pieces, and there are many points where you can discover discrepancies that might indicate cheating. And you can have as many observers as you like at any part of the process, from opposing political parties. So you use their distrust of each other to create trust in the process.
Voting systems are like banks or computer systems: it's not humanly possible to invent one that is safe from fraud, malfeasance, or even human error. Except unlike banks and computer systems, voting systems are by their very nature designed and operated by the very people who would benefit from manipulating them.
Political distrust only goes so far, because winning elections tends to give you more control over the government, which in turn allows you to manipulate elections so that you continue to win them. On the local level, the opposition party often diminishes to the point where not only do they lack the manpower and organization to effectively even contest elections, but the national party effectively abandons the area entirely.
> Political distrust only goes so far, because winning elections tends to give you more control over the government, which in turn allows you to manipulate elections
In banana republics, sure, in civilized countries, not so much.
> On the local level, the opposition party
Again, I'm sorry the US has the incredibly shitty first-past-the-post election shit, because that is the cause of the inevitable two-party system shit.
If the US had a better representative democracy, this wouldn't be a problem.
However, even with the situation you describe, it should be possible to guess which districts will be the closest in margin, and make sure you put more eyes on those districts, in favor of districts that are sure to go either way. That's good enough to secure the election result.
> Again, I'm sorry the US has the incredibly shitty first-past-the-post election shit, because that is the cause of the inevitable two-party system shit.
It's not just the US; it's every English-speaking country except New Zealand. Proportional representation doesn't really stop governments from manipulating their elections either--for example, the Russian Duma has proportional representation.
That's an interesting point. We could require voting software and hardware be open-source, but I guess there's still opportunity for it to be tampered with during its deployment an operation. Hardware and software are complicated, so it's not as easy for the average worker at the polling location to verify.
We could have a solution where the hardware and software are developed independently and both include logic to independently verify the other's authenticity... but that's still open to attack vectors (however difficult they may be).
All that said, the urn system you described does not reflect any experience I've had. I've always been asked to fill out a single paper form with choices for multiple offices and submit the form to either a ballot box or a worker at the polling location. That complicates the tallying process, but I can definitely see how it is still easier to audit than a voting machine.
You can have machines that receive and scan the ballot (instead of a simple box), without losing the paper trail, and keeping a count of the number of submitted ballots (the number of used ballots is also controlled and counted).
> When I vote, it is my understanding that when I stuff my paper ballot into the box (or sometimes even just hand it over to someone), I am forced to trust the staff to account for my vote. Personally, I don't feel like I'm any more protected against bad actors by using pencil-and-paper.
When I vote, it is my understanding that when I stuff my paper ballot into the box (or sometimes even just hand it over to someone), I am forced to trust the staff to account for my vote. Personally, I don't feel like I'm any more protected against bad actors by using pencil-and-paper.
The only truly-auditable solution I can think of is to have everyone make their vote public, but that is obviously not a reasonable solution.