> why browsers can still stop fingerprinting (emphasis mine)
> privacy defenses don’t need to be perfect. Many researchers and engineers think about privacy in all-or-nothing terms
So browsers can't stop fingerprinting but they can reduce it, and the article author's title falls in the same all-or-nothing trap that they criticize others for. Too often practicality is viewed as defeatism. I don't remember defeatism, I remember practical limitations to stopping all uniqueness vectors but realization that some can be stopped.
I remember somebody who worked with Firefox saying that even the idea of not by default revealing the OS and hardware platform received too much opposition.
> privacy defenses don’t need to be perfect. Many researchers and engineers think about privacy in all-or-nothing terms
So browsers can't stop fingerprinting but they can reduce it, and the article author's title falls in the same all-or-nothing trap that they criticize others for. Too often practicality is viewed as defeatism. I don't remember defeatism, I remember practical limitations to stopping all uniqueness vectors but realization that some can be stopped.