There were experiments that were not explained by the liquid theory.
Now we have data and people for some reason want to claim that a theory with magical super complex and not-even-yet-describable and very-very-irreducible element(s) is a better fit than a good old box full of tiny yet specialized parts fine-tuned to work together over millions of years.
You mean, is this a falsifiable/testable theory? Yes, it's testable, we see very specific neuropathologies, almost like on-off switches affecting very specific functions/faculties of the mind, and they usually correspond well to brain damage locations.
So in that sense the experiment is to enumerate the basic (built-in) functional components of the mind and corresponding implementational level machinery, and the of course the reverse (try to enumerate the implementation components and match them with functions) can generate important data (is there a function that has no implementation?).
That said, since the claim is that there's no magical component in the mind, and that's kind of hard to prove, but easily falsifiable, just find a/the magical component.
The problem is the same as with the soul, and the self, and so on.