Luckily, the politicians in Germany and Europe wake up. They want to build up European chip and hardware facilities to have the full chain in Europe. Also they plan to demand certification and customer visible labels. Finally!
Luckily, the politicians in Germany and Europe wake up. They want to build up European chip and hardware facilities to have the full chain in Europe. Also they plan to demand certification and customer visible labels. Finally!
This is the same Thomas de Maizière that backed a law that allows German law enforcement agencies to order companies to insert back doors in their products:
"Luckily, the politicians in Germany and Europe wake up. They want to build up European chip and hardware facilities to have the full chain in Europe. Also they plan to demand certification and customer visible labels. Finally!"
So far similar efforts by EU were rather underwhelming - but this one is probably the most important. I believe EU is the only global actor that can achieve the goal of creating reliable hardware and software. The still decentralized nature of EU means that no partner can afford any unilateral action (like backdoors) - and a conspiracy on the level of whole EU is impossible.
How does geopolitical location make hardware and software secure? Hint: it does not. It is clear there is demand at some level for secure computation and patching current hardware and software is not going to get the job done. Certification and labels imply we know how to do something we'll enough to say this is the right way. It is clear that we do not, so certification of hardware is most likely to just ensure every chip has the same exact problems.
I've read that, several years ago, parts of the Russian security establishment switched to mechanical typewriters.