I think in the real world there are two scenarios, someone is using one of PBKDF2/Bcrypt/Scrypt - in which case all of this is moot, set an appropriate work factor/#of iterations, and you are secure with even a moderate sanity check against the password. Interesting note - said sanity check, ironically, could be a simple as a lookup - the top 4 billion passwords can be stored in a packed 24 gigabyte lookup table on disk which can be searched in < 100 milliseconds).
The other scenario is when you doing a single pass of a hash, in which case the salt is irrelevant for the security of that password.
Everyone here understands that you need to salt when your dictionary takes a long time to build (Say, more than 1 millisecond/password, which equals 2.5 billion passwords/month) - not everyone appreciates that salting a fast password (more than 2.5 billion passwords/second) - adds no security to that particular password.
The scenario where there is moderate "stretching" (by which I presume you mean running multiple iterations of a hash), with no randomized salt, is a bit of a straw man - who would bother to go the effort of "stretching" and not stick a randomized salt in while they are at it?
The other scenario is when you doing a single pass of a hash, in which case the salt is irrelevant for the security of that password.
Everyone here understands that you need to salt when your dictionary takes a long time to build (Say, more than 1 millisecond/password, which equals 2.5 billion passwords/month) - not everyone appreciates that salting a fast password (more than 2.5 billion passwords/second) - adds no security to that particular password.
The scenario where there is moderate "stretching" (by which I presume you mean running multiple iterations of a hash), with no randomized salt, is a bit of a straw man - who would bother to go the effort of "stretching" and not stick a randomized salt in while they are at it?