Technical question: assuming no targeted malware, is it possible for an actor outside of the embassy network to cut internet access to Assange's devices while leaving the other devices in the network unaffected?
The ISP could do it in theory with filtering based on traffic patterns. The use of cryptography in the embassy plus where the normal traffic was going would determine how effective it was in terms of just hitting him.
Seems totally unnecessary, considering he could just be handed someone else's laptop, right? I'd imagine it would have to be the entire embassy, or else the network that he has access to in his space.
What I'm saying is that most of the embassy connections are probably not going to Tor, Wikileaks, known proxies, etc. They could filter just that to give him lots of headaches. Plus look at and block every site they connect to. They probably already have a team dedicated to him anyway.
He might work around it but it's an option. I don't know about whether it's legal under UK law but their surveillance organizations seem to get away with a lot.
> I don't know about whether it's legal under UK law but their surveillance organizations seem to get away with a lot.
If GCHQ are involved with any such interference, their actions are fairly unconstrained by law. Paraphrasing Intelligence Services Act 1994, s.(3)[1]:
> [GCHQ shall] monitor or interfere with electromagnetic, acoustic and other emissions and any equipment producing such emissions [...] in the interests of national security, [or] in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in relation to the actions or intentions of persons outside the British Islands [or] in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.
As far as I know, there is nothing in statute that constrains how they go about that (Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 adds a couple of hurdles in regards to interception). Any oversight comes from various Parliamentary committees.
