Stephen Pinker quotes that exact passage in _The Better Angels of our Nature_. He rebuts:
> Orwell was wrong about one thing: that political euphemism was a phenomenon of his time. A century and a half before Orwell, Edmund Burke complained about the euphemisms emanating from revolutionary France:
> "The whole compass of the language is tried to find sinonimies and circumlocutions for massacres and murder. They are never called by their common name. Massacre is sometimes called _agitation_, sometimes _effervescence_, sometimes _excess_; sometimes _too continued an excercise of a revokutionary power_.
As someone who believes in "choice", if that's the euphemistic term, I will still argue that abortion absolutely involves killing a human being. That is a thing which you once were, given the natural course of events, it would grow into a living, breathing human like you or I. It's not like a sperm or an egg which have no potential until positive action is taken, the deed is done and that's becoming a human if we let it.
Which is Orwell's point, really. Abortion is death. It also is defensible. But because "killing" is hard and difficult to defend, we come up with euphemistic terms so we can stomach it.
I appreciate your intellectual honesty. Abortion is death, taking a human life.
The question is whether the justification suffices. For abortion, the justification is: "Because the mother doesn't want the child, we allow her to kill it in the womb."
The womb, her body, is her property. It's unfortunate that the child can't survive outside of it, but that doesn't make throwing it out comparable to Orwell's examples.
And there was once a matter of debate whether blacks in the US counted as full human beings.
If there's brain activity and a beating heart, there's really no scientific basis for saying an unborn human isn't a human being.
This goes back to Orwell's essay. We use euphemisms to soften brutal realities. A war monger may say we're simply bombing "savages", and an abortionist may say we're simply culling a "clump of cells."
There's a question of viability that I think matters. An unborn human starts as a clump of cells, develops a brain and heart but is still not viable on its own, and then if all goes well it becomes viable by the time it is born. It's human all the way through, but different people draw the line on abortion in different places along the path to viability.
Slaves were always completely viable. Bringing them up in a discussion about abortion is a strawman argument.
If you use viability as a guideline, you do bring into the debate people who were viable, but who through disease or accident are no longer viable. Should they be 'abort-able'? I think if the rules around abortion were flexible enough to apply to these people as well, they'd probably be solid enough to satisfy almost everyone's moral and legal sensibilities.
I may regret posting this since it's getting far off the topic of language, but the discussion is an interesting one.
I don't think the line is drawn on the viability spectrum. A baby isn't viable until a month before it comes out of the womb, and that's a stretch. So I don't think this is a matter of people disagreeing with what constitutes viable because there really can't be any debate about that. I would argue that "potentiality" is a better term here.
The arguments, at their core, revolve around the fact that you have two living things who's interests may not be aligned. It's a question of who's interests will be favored.
Now, you can feel what you want about this, I don't want to get into a policy argument, but let's not dance around the issue, abortion is about the conflict between two abhorrent options.
> Orwell was wrong about one thing: that political euphemism was a phenomenon of his time. A century and a half before Orwell, Edmund Burke complained about the euphemisms emanating from revolutionary France:
> "The whole compass of the language is tried to find sinonimies and circumlocutions for massacres and murder. They are never called by their common name. Massacre is sometimes called _agitation_, sometimes _effervescence_, sometimes _excess_; sometimes _too continued an excercise of a revokutionary power_.