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Because you're moving the "exit" from your non-anonymous local ISP to your non-anonymous colo provider. If you want to hide your traffic or at least make your adversary work a little to determine who you are, shared VPN endpoints are better.



How is that any different? ISPs don't let just anybody know who the subscriber is at a given IP (though if you do reverse lookups, many ISPs so leak a lot of locality information, so still a good idea to use some VPN instead of no VPN).

My Streisand hosted on AWS looks to the outside like anybody else's Streisand hosted on AWS, doesn't it?

Similarly, my f-secure egress looks like anybody else's f-secure egress, so what's the difference?

I don't really know, I don't use a VPN. Really asking.


ISPs don't let just anybody know who the subscriber is at a given IP

They certainly let law enforcement and intelligence agencies know, often without a warrant.

Please read my comment as if the threat model includes panopticon governments, not common skids running aircrack-ng.


And reputable VPN vendors resist efforts by nation states to procure information about subscribers? I would expect to have to pay a handsome fee for that.

(I'm not saying you're wrong; again I've not really thought about having to thoroughly anonymize my own traffic.)




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