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There's a bit of irony to this, too. If Apple had been more cooperative earlier, law enforcement probably would've taken the white hat approach. Apple protected users from the FBI, but is now potentially unable to protect them from organised crime.



There is absolutely no proof of that. What they where asking for was keys to every lock in the world. It would have given them unprecedented power to do whatever they wanted. Apple did the right thing. Users should always come first especially when privacy is at stake.


They were willing to hand over the phone to Apple and allow all work to take place on Apple premises. How does that affect other phones?


So have you not heard that this would set a legal precedent? Apple would get pestered until they finally create an automatic gateway for turn key security breaking, not unlike the wiretap portals setup by telecoms - or the frequently abused youtube DMCA mechanisms.


It only sets a precedent that they can give phones to Apple and have them unlock them, as long as it's possible for them to do so. If Apple decides to build a general backdoor and hand it to the government that's entirely their decision.


In fact, it also only sets precedent if they have to legally force Apple to do it. Apple could've used their discretion to comply in this particular case, avoiding courts, and avoiding legal precedents being set.


> It only sets a precedent...

Yeah, it "only" sets a precedent that the government can compel a company to reverse all the work put into securing a product, no possible market driven unintended consequences there.

> If Apple decides...

Classic victim blaming, "decision" is the wrong word to use here. Constant negative reinforcement leads to conditioned responses - not decisions.


It wouldn't set a legal precedent unless a court ruled on it. It would only have come to that if Apple continued to decline the FBI's request.


Again, victim blaming. How is that any different from the false choice "We can do this the hard way, or the easy way"?

Have you considered what will happen to the number of such requests as devices continue to become more secure?


That's not blaming anyone. It's objectively the circumstance under which a precedent would be created. My understanding of your point was that Apple shouldn't comply in this case because it would set precedent. My point is that choosing to comply was actually one of the ways they could've avoided setting precedent.


> It would only have come to that if Apple continued to decline the FBI's request.

> That's not blaming anyone.

I guess I misunderstood you because you left out the other potential scenarios, like instead of "Apple continued" the "FBI ceased" - or the "DOJ never attempted to compel Apple under the All Writs act in the first place". Apple had no control over the situation outside appeasing the FBI, the state controlled every other aspect.

> My understanding of your point...

You think it wouldn't come up further down the road as the FBI demands more and more, after they've already built the tools to meet prior demands?


As devices become more secure, Apple will no longer be able to unlock them.

If you put a backdoor into your phones, you should expect to have to use it.


> As devices become more secure, Apple will no longer be able to unlock them.

That is only true if revoking trust is the only thing left to do to increase iphone security against every potential bad actor. That isn't the case, and that leaves plenty of time to pester Apple with unlocking phones collected in every investigation from now until then.

> If you put a backdoor into your phones, you should expect to have to use it.

What law is that, the All Writs act? That is what was being tested, because not everybody shares your certainty about it. The moral problem of the forced labor of an unrelated party is enough to make me disagree. Also, that logic could easily be used to justify the forced inclusion of a backdoor in an otherwise secure device. You can't have it both ways, a secure device and a device manufactured by a company that can be legally compelled to do whatever the state deems "necessary or appropriate".


I don't think labor should be forced, but data should be accessible. Apple had the keys to use the backdoor, and they should have been forced to choose between using them to sign software, or handing them over and letting the FBI sign it themselves. Apple would prefer to sign it themselves, so they can effectively be forced to do so.

I disagree that they can force the inclusion of a backdoor using the same logic. The reason I think they can compel action is that the real thing they want from Apple is information, I.e. the key. Apple can get out of revealing the key by using it themselves.


> ...but data should be accessible.

This is the most important part of the whole thing. Where do you draw the line, is everybody legally obligated to comply with such demands? Well obviously those directly involved with whatever crime is being investigated are exposed to such compulsion, but so are third party service providers. But in the case of these third parties, there are a lot of laws dictating their part in great detail. For its part as a service provider, Apple supplied the user data it had. What the FBI has done is declare loud and clear that they'd like to expand those subject to compulsion to include anyone it designates, for any purpose that isn't explicitly illegal, thanks to All Writs. Now in this case they say, for the victims, they're being exhaustive in pursuing what is most likely a dry hole. But what is to stop them from wielding such authority over every manufacturer of everything that the subject of the investigation touched? How about compelling every luckless individual who lives along the subject's morning commute to turn over all video and image files because it might help them in their investigation. For as crazy as that sounds, consider the fact that there is no logical distinction between any of those scenarios.

> I don't think labor should be forced ... they should have been forced to choose...

You can't believe both of those, because compulsion eliminates choice. That would be like saying "I'm not forcing you to run, it is your choice, but if you don't then I'll kill you".

> ...they want from Apple is information, I.e. the key.

No, they want on demand access - they don't care about any key. Even if Apple were to get rid of the key, there is historical precedent for the state pulling some insane precrimes logic in order to expand authority - see the commerce clause. I'll explain that reference briefly: the federal government has explicitly defined authority over commerce that occurs between states, but it was reasoned that commerce within a state could potentially result in the absence of interstate commerce, therefor the federal government has authority over all commerce... Now imagine that reasoning being applied to a manufacturer who doesn't have the capability to, but could if it wanted, respond to a court order. Oh, and lets not forget the clipper chip, a nice indicator of the state's position on forcing manufacturers to backdoor consumer products in the interested of potential investigations.


>Where do you draw the line, is everybody legally obligated to comply with such demands?

If I have a warrent, I can force you to hand over all information allowed by the warrent. That's how warrents work.

They're able to get any data a judge agrees with.

I don't think they're able to compel labor.

>How about compelling every luckless individual who lives along the subject's morning commute to turn over all video and image files because it might help them in their investigation.

If a judge thinks there's probable cause, they can require this, so far as I know.

>You can't believe both of those, because compulsion eliminates choice.

They have the ability to compel Apple to hand over data. They don't have the ability to compel Apple to perform labor unrelated to producing data.

>No, they want on demand access - they don't care about any key.

The FBI explicitly asked for the key at one point in the case.

Could you explain how your commerce example is in any way precedent?


> If I have a warrent...

> If a judge thinks there's probable cause...

> They have the ability to compel Apple to hand over data.

Warrants aren't golden tickets, if a warrant exceeds the court's authority then it isn't worth anything. That is exactly what was going to be resolved here, a court ordered Apple to do something that Apple thought exceeded the state's authority - thanks to the FBI the question remain unresolved (which the DOJ prefers to a precedent going against them).

> I don't think they're able to compel labor.

Subpoena to appear immediately comes to mind, NSLs might reach that level as well - they certainly exceed "hand over data". But the point isn't really about court orders during discovery, it is the final interpretation of an existing law that will determine the nature of forced labor. There are plenty of laws that compel labor.

> The FBI explicitly asked for the key at one point in the case.

No, they presented it as an alternative after they met resistance (aka threatened).

> Could you explain how your commerce example is in any way precedent?

"historical precedent" (an example, a demonstration of disposition), not a legal precedent. I'm disappointed that you focused on that and overlooked the point - the use of "precrimes", "potential" and "clipper chip" is the hint.


If Apple had done as requested, the FBI would not have hired a contractor and we would not know that a contractor capable of this existed.




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