The FBI or any other government agency has always been able to demand companies do exactly this.
It was the height of naivety to think otherwise; it's not like we lack historical examples of what happens when a small number of companies make themselves the linchpin of trust/security:
Prior to this event, I had no idea that this generation of programmers seriously thought they could centralize so much information and control into their own hands, and somehow keep it out of the government's hands when they eventually came knocking.
Even if Apple wins this argument, they'll have to keep winning every argument, every network intrusion, every espionage attempt, forever. This particular argument is pointless; the high-value-single-point-of-failure security model is fundamentally flawed.
So we should what? Throw up our hands, not protect anyone who needs a cell phone? Concluded that everyone who isn't running RMS' Lemote Yeelong is fucked, and throw them to the wolves?
It seems obvious to me that we have to take the world as it is; yes, centralization of security is bad. Yes, we should fight to get away from this centralization of power in companies like Apple.
But as it stands now, it's incredibly important to support Apple's fight against this dramatic expansion of the All Writs Act's powers. The fight isn't "pointless", it's the exact opposite -- the security and privacy of hundreds of millions of people in the world, today, rests on the success of fights like these.
How much better it would be if we were all running Gnu/Debian Mobile on our OpenPhones is completely irrelevant. That's not the world we live in and better, open solutions are going to take years and decades to work toward.
We are never going to get to that world if Apple loses fights like these. We already have legislators working to make even the security offered by iOS today, for all its flawed dependence on Apple, illegal. Once these privacy and security rights are gone, that's the new normal, and open, truly securable phones won't even be legal to manufacture in the first place.
In addition to lobbying against the government in this case, we should loudly criticize Apple for putting this backdoor in their design!
Let's invert the use of the "ticking bomb" propaganda - say we've got a phone with data that can prevent an eminent attack. What person is going to say we shouldn't unlock the phone, because it would set a bad precedent? I'm a steadfast believer in the idea that computing devices should be private extensions of one's mind, but I would still say it's stupid to not hack into such a device if it can be done!
If you want a device that guarantees individual privacy against the manufacturer/USG, it has to be designed for such. You can't build an insecure system and then expect an A for effort.
This is not a dramatic expansion of the AWA's power. This is exactly what the AWA is meant to do. The few carve-outs of the authority of the AWA go much farther -- that's exactly what CALEA is, for example, and it has been held up by the courts repeatedly.
Your references to the GPL nonsense are a false dichotomy; All we need is ownership rights over the electronics we buy, like we've had -- even on Apple platforms -- for decades.
Supporting Apple now just ensures that when Apple does fall -- whether it's an expansion of CALEA, or espionage, or just a shift in their business priorities -- we may never know about it, and the impact on privacy/security is likely to be much worse.
If Apple loses this battle, there's no real impact to the risk profile. Apple already had the backdoor. The only change is that we're forced to be honest about that backdoor's existence, and start thinking real hard about how to avoid this kind of centralization of power, and its inevitable use, going forward.
In this case, the corporation is the threat, and corporate statism is probably the worst possible end game.
The state isn't really the problem, though -- centralization of authority is. The DoJ issue is basically moot; this is a lawful request made under public scrutiny and judicial review.
Whereas Apple could just change their business priorities at any point, and never even has to tell us.
It was the height of naivety to think otherwise; it's not like we lack historical examples of what happens when a small number of companies make themselves the linchpin of trust/security:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A
Prior to this event, I had no idea that this generation of programmers seriously thought they could centralize so much information and control into their own hands, and somehow keep it out of the government's hands when they eventually came knocking.
Even if Apple wins this argument, they'll have to keep winning every argument, every network intrusion, every espionage attempt, forever. This particular argument is pointless; the high-value-single-point-of-failure security model is fundamentally flawed.