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The issue is Apple cannot verify a secure touch ID replacement over a compromised touch ID replacement. Without knowing if your replacement is secure the change potentially compromises the security of the whole device.

IMO bricking on touch ID issues is extreme, but maximises the security of the device.



>IMO bricking on touch ID issues is extreme, but maximises the security of the device.

We are all smart people here and there are several ways to have security without bricking expensive hardware.

First, the update can wipe the device instead of bricking it.

Second, Apple can provide an option to replace the fingerprint chip and charge, $150-$200 or whatever it costs for it.

There would be several better solutions that the most profitable company in the world could figure out if they wanted to. It's funny how their particular solution happens to make them even more money through shutting down third party repairs and making people buy new phones.

This is like your home alarm software(made by the home builder) remotely burning down your house and telling you to build a new one because someone may have tampered with home access and could possibly enter your home.


  Second, Apple can provide an option to replace the fingerprint chip and charge, $150-$200 or whatever it costs for it.
At the end of the article, it said that affected customers should contact Apple Support. Are you sure they are not offering a hardware fix at that point? It doesn't sound to me like they're just letting people hang.


From a different article:

>When Olmos, who says he has spent thousands of pounds on Apple products over the years, took it to an Apple store in London, staff told him there was nothing they could do, and that his phone was now junk. He had to pay £270 for a replacement and is furious.


There is a failure in the apple stores vs phone support. I went to two Apple stores to try to get my watch band replaced or fixed under warranty and was told by both of them "no way no how" - but phone support had no problem replacing the band.

I find the stores are somewhat inconsistent in their application of policy. (Particular if the policy isn't well defined ahead of time, as in this case)

(As an aside, the practice of requiring an appointment to talk to a support person or even just drop off a broken computer is maddening.)


Alternative interpretation -- "A custom voided his warranty by installing some rando third-party aftermarket parts, and is furious that it didn't work out."


Yes. Just as destroying the phone with a hammer maximizes the security of the device. Effective but entirely useless.

The phone would still work perfectly fine and safe if Touch ID would be disabled and input from the sensor wouldn't be trusted.


> The issue is Apple cannot verify a secure touch ID replacement over a compromised touch ID replacement. Without knowing if your replacement is secure the change potentially compromises the security of the whole device.

What are you even talking about?

If the fingerprint scanner is suspicious, just disable it and leave the rest running. And this is in fact what happens, until a software update is installed and then the phone suddenly decides to brick itself completely.


Does the 911 feature still works on these phones? 911 should work even without a SIM card and without any other authentication, to purposefully disable a phone in this way may have bigger repercussions than just 'security'.


How? TouchID is the less secure authentication than password/PIN anyway (which is shown by the fact that you need to enter PIN/Pass right after boot). How would just disabling TouchID auth be a worse option?


>TouchID is the less secure authentication than password/PIN anyway (which is shown by the fact that you need to enter PIN/Pass right after boot).

The fact that you need to enter PIN right after boot, just shows that they use "two factor authentication" to make it even more secure.

It doesn't IN ANY WAY show that TouchID is "the less secure authentication" method of the two.


You can do anything you want on the phone without using Touch ID at all. The fingerprint sensor is not a necessary factor in their implementation, while the passcode is.


> You can do anything you want on the phone without using Touch ID at all

I believe ApplePay requires TouchID.


I can't try because Apple Pay isn't available here yet. According to this support document it works without Touch ID (emphasis mine):

> To help ensure the security of Apple Pay, you must have a passcode set on your device and, optionally, Touch ID. [...] To send your payment information, you must authenticate using Touch ID or your passcode.

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203027


Fingerprints are impossible to change and can be brute-forced. Therefore, fingerprint security is less secure than a password that can be changed.


Brute forced with what? Trying different fingers?


A fingerprint, like any piece of data, is handled at the lowest levels as a number. A number with some constraints, but a number.

By feeding numbers into the scanner instead of fingers, you can accomplish the same effect as feeding random strings into a password box. Further, it's also possible to take fingerprints through social engineering, or by getting at the database of a company that uses fingerprints as security. Five bucks says someone's already storing a bunch of fingerprint data as plaintext.


>By feeding numbers into the scanner instead of fingers, you can accomplish the same effect as feeding random strings into a password box.

Isn't this exactly why they DON'T allow you to use the iPhone with a potentially tampered with HW/TouchID -- e.g. the very feature/issue we're discussing?


Well, yes.

I'd argue that fingerprints for security are just silly to begin with.


> The issue is Apple cannot verify a secure touch ID replacement over a compromised touch ID replacement. Without knowing if your replacement is secure the change potentially compromises the security of the whole device.

The correct solution there would be to pop up a warning saying the TouchID hardware has been tampered with, and giving the user an option to validate it.


That wouldn't really be a good idea. Someone could steal your phone and replace the TouchID hardware. Then this popup comes up and they say, oh yeah this hardware is totally legit! Then they get your data, impersonate you, charge stuff etc.


The prompt would have to be after you authenticated your phone in some other way, like via the passcode.

I think it's totally OK not to accept authentication from an unvalidated device, but a legitimate user should be able to do the validation.


I think the post is referring to a hotel maid scenario.


Fingerprint scanners are useless for security. My fingerprints are everywhete, especially all over my phone. Touch id merely buys time, which can increase security but if they get my fingerprints, make a dummy finger then they need very little time to open my phone. If they are determined they'll do it. If they are not, probably they won't care about the data in my phone.


They have at most 48 hours (or perhaps 24?) and 5 tries to find your fingerprint and unlock the device. TouchID will discard the keys and require a passphrase if it is not used for a while or after the fifth invalid fingerprint attempt. The window of opportunity is not that big. I would not characterize it as useless at all.


> The issue is Apple cannot verify a secure touch ID replacement over a compromised touch ID replacement.

Couldn't they just ask the user? Use the backup password to authenticate.

If it's my device, I want to be the one who chooses what I trust.




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