What should have saved the space shuttle Columbia was establishing protocols to deal with foam debris.
It was known well in advance of the Columbia disaster that the foam pieces dislodged during launch. It was known that they caused damage to the heat shield ceramic tiles. It was known that displacement of even a few tiles could lead to catastrophic failure on reentry.
There were no steps taken to minimize or eliminate foam impacts. There was no protocol or infrastructure in place for in orbit imaging of the heat shield to check for structural damage, hence the decision not to perform visual inspection. There was no rescue plan.
These factors combined to create an impossible scenario.
Do you rush through a refurbishment of a second vehicle of the same design for rescue? That's an extremely risky call that could cost the lives of more astronauts.
The point I am making is that in all complex systems, failure should be an expected result, and mitigation strategies should already be in place.
The best time to rescue Columbia was before it ever launched.
If you assume say a 10% mission failure rate, which is high for shuttle missions, its a good bet to use a shuttle missions to rescue a shuttle mission that has already failed but not killed everyone yet.
I always thought an interesting idea would be to launch an unmanned Soyuz to dock with Columbia.
In 1960's Soyuzes were launched sometimes without orbital module - project Zond; that's saving of about 15% of mass. Even if that wouldn't be sufficient, Zonds were launched on Protons with DM kicker - and that combination flew as far as over the Moon, so I'm sure it could match Columbia orbit inclination and height.
Russians launch on average more often than anybody else, so they could pull that attempt. Problems are that Soyuz spacecraft takes 2 years to manufacture - but money could have helped there, especially in 2003, before oil prices made incomes larger in Russia. Protons were manufactured in larger quantities - may be more that 10 per year. Even with one Soyuz - for 3 crew - some Progress spacecrafts, which are built in larger numbers, could be added rather soon, maintaining the remaining Columbia crew until further options would become available.
So, to sum this up - Russian spacecrafts could technically reach Columbia in 2003.
Would it have been possible to launch supplies and a repair kit to the shuttle using a more traditional unmanned rocket launch?
I imagine the preparation time for those rockets is less than the shuttle and that it'd require a much smaller payload, which could make it even more flexible.
For that to work would have needed to have on hand something like a Cygnus or Dragon commercial supply vehicle and the first unmanned supply to the ISS that wasn't a Progress was 5 years later in 2008. [1] There was Progress M-47 which launched Feb 2, 2003. I'm not sure where that would have put it in their launch preparations. It doesn't look like Progress would have had the ability to match the inclination of Columbia though. See Mvandenbergh's comment on https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7305224
TL;DR Probably not. The only existing vehicle that could autonomously rendezvous with the Shuttle was Progress and it couldn't make it to the Columbia's inclination. [2]
[1] I used unmanned flights to the ISS here since anything else is unlikely to be in production to be re-purposed by NASA. (Also I don't know where to start looking for an easy list of alternatives).
[2] It might have been possible but it would have required cooperation from Russia and China and then there's no docking adapter on Columbia's mission so Progress would have had to keep station while Columbia's crew did an EVA to get the supplies.
If you were extremely desperate, it seems like it ought to be possible to basically put this stuff in a fancy box/bag, launch it, and have the Shuttle do all the maneuvering to rendezvous.
The time it would take to build, prepare, and launch the rocket that would carry it would, of course, sink the whole idea anyway.
You'd still need a strong enough structure to hold up to the launch, telemetry system to track it and a vacuum stage with enough precision to place it in a phased orbit with the shuttle so Columbia would have a chance to come get it. But at that point you're eating into the fuel the Columbia needs to maintain orbit. It's been a while since I read the article (Ars has done a piece on this before) and I haven't read the report but I don't think there's a number for how long the orbit could be maintained.
I don't think Columbia needed any significant amount of fuel to maintain orbit. At these altitudes, orbital decay is a matter of months or years. The report says that it "would have been placed in a tail-down gravity gradient attitude that would require very little propellant."
According to the accident report, the time in orbit was limited by breathing consumables, specifically the lithium hydroxide used to remove CO2, and the onboard oxygen. Both were probably good for about 30 days.
Yeah I knew the other human consumables were the main issue that's right there in the article. I didn't know and didn't want to assume how long the orbit would last though since it didn't seem to be covered with a specific time. Also even if it was a small amount how much would be eaten up rendezvousing with a hypothetical dumb supply bag?
I think the major propellant need is for deorbiting, which would dwarf all other needs. Attitude control is probably close enough to zero to be ignorable. The big question is how much would be required to rendezvous, and I don't have even the slightest idea there. They clearly thought there was enough to rendezvous with Atlantis, but it's a whole different game when the other craft is under active control and can also maneuver.
The report says Columbia had 448fps of propellant available. The deorbit burn was at least 200fps, so that leaves at most 248fps for other uses. The rendezvous burn plans listed in the report for the hypothetical Atlantis rescue list propellant use of over 300fps which is clearly too much if rendezvousing with the dumb supply bag is even comparable, let alone worse.
The report does mention this briefly, discussing an Ariane 4 that was almost ready to go at the time. It says, "The challenge with developing a supply kit, building an appropriate housing and separation system, and reprogramming the Ariane seems very difficult in three weeks..." but doesn't mention the feasibility of rendezvousing with that housing. Whether that's because it can be done or because it's not even worth looking at that sort of detail I don't know, but I'd bet on the latter.
Any launch would take months to prepare at best, and that's with a seriously abbreviated timetable with everybody hustling like crazy.
The only reason Atlantis was even possibly maybe sort of an option is because it was already nearly ready to go, close the end of its preparation for launching its own mission not too much later.
For anyone looking for a quick summary, the problem is orbital inclination (i.e. how tilted the orbit is relative to the equator). Columbia was in a 39 degree inclination, and for reasons related to physics (their launch site is at a high latitude) and politics (China lies to the east) the Russians can't launch into inclinations less than 51 degrees. It's possible to change inclinations after launch, but requires a metric buttload (technical term) of fuel.
This is all leaving aside the fact that the Russians (or, indeed, anybody) don't just have rockets sitting around ready to go at a moment's notice.
Are you talking about the thread with Mvandenbergh and tanzam75? Based on:
> If you launch from Baikonur directly into a 46° orbit, you will drop spent rocket stages on China. That is why the Russians launch into a 51° orbit, even though their launch site is at 46°.
> With a Proton, you have enough delta-v to launch into 51° and then make a change of plane to 39°.
It could have made the orbit just fine it just wouldn't be able to boost the shuttle into the ISS's plane. It probably could have brought them supplies if China agreed to allow the spent boosters to fall.
Read it originally. Seems like the sort of crazy dramatic plan that plays well in movies and tugs at the part of us that wants to think we did everything we possibly could to save the crews' lives. But in reality, with such poorly planned rush efforts, it's appallingly likely to fail catastrophically and cause even more death.
One thing I'm still not clear about is how much the ground crew knew about the damage. Did they have any idea there was a serious problem? Did the crew know that the ship was compromised? Was this ever seriously considered? Or is this all just hindsight?
"Without on-orbit pictures of Columbia, the Debris Assessment Team was restricted to using a mathematical modeling tool called Crater to assess damage, although it had not been designed with this type of impact in mind. Team members concluded over the next six days that some localized heating damage would most likely occur during re-entry, but they could not definitively state that structural damage would result. On January 24, the Debris Assessment Team made a presentation of these results to the Mission Evaluation Room, whose manager gave a verbal summary (with no data) of that presentation to the Mission Management Team the same day. The Mission Management Team declared the debris strike a “turnaround” issue and did not pursue a request for imagery.
Even after the Debris Assessment Teamʼs conclusion had been reported to the Mission Management Team, engineers throughout NASA and Mission Control continued to ex- change e-mails and discuss possible damage. These messages and discussions were generally sent only to people within the sendersʼ area of expertise and level of seniority.
At 2:30 a.m. EST on February 1, 2003, the Entry Flight Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Center. The Flight Control Team was not working any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team indicated no concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other."
TLDR. "They" knew that their was a potential problem, but the bureaucracy didn't.
The decision making process was described in far more detail in the linked report.
It was known well in advance of the Columbia disaster that the foam pieces dislodged during launch. It was known that they caused damage to the heat shield ceramic tiles. It was known that displacement of even a few tiles could lead to catastrophic failure on reentry.
There were no steps taken to minimize or eliminate foam impacts. There was no protocol or infrastructure in place for in orbit imaging of the heat shield to check for structural damage, hence the decision not to perform visual inspection. There was no rescue plan.
These factors combined to create an impossible scenario.
Do you rush through a refurbishment of a second vehicle of the same design for rescue? That's an extremely risky call that could cost the lives of more astronauts.
The point I am making is that in all complex systems, failure should be an expected result, and mitigation strategies should already be in place.
The best time to rescue Columbia was before it ever launched.