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No, the roaming in Mosh is unrelated to OpenSSH's roaming feature.



But authentication in Mosh still relies on OpenSSH, so auth could be intercepted by an attacker after which Mosh is completely open to them:

https://mosh.mit.edu/

> However, in typical usage, Mosh relies on SSH to exchange keys at the beginning of a session, so Mosh will inherit the weaknesses of SSH—at least insofar as they affect the brief SSH session that is used to set up a long-running Mosh session.


But Mosh uses OpenSSH for authentication. And if roaming is enabled by default on the client this could still be an issue, no? I'd say it's still a good idea to add "UseRoaming no" to ssh_config.


Right, but mosh uses ssh for initial key setup. I suspect it is possible to exploit that. (As an occasional Windows user who's using the Mosh Chrome extension, I have no idea how much risk I'm at; can't edit ssh_config, it's not even exposed)


Irrelevant; it still affects mosh as mosh does an ssh connection first to do auth and key exchange. That ssh session is potentially vulnerable when connecting to a malicious or compromised host.


Doesn't mosh initially establish a connection via SSH, though?




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