and how much of the system is protected by trusted bsd by default: none of it
how many people ever bother to write and deploy a trustedbsd policy: (to first order approximation) nobody
Defaults matter, a feature matrix checkbox is simply deceptive because the fact something isn't on (and configured) by default often means its an insane amount to work to try to enable it and/or thing are unfixably broken when you do (from a user point of view)
unfortunately both these things are true of trustedBSD
The TrustedBSD features are used by appliance vendors who base their product on FreeBSD. Applicances have very narrow profiles of acceptable use and thus it's actually sane to develop policies for them.
That's true. It goes back further than TrustedBSD: Secure Computing Corporation invented Type Enforcement, put it in a high assurance system (LOCK), put it into a BSD-OS for a firewall (Sidewinder firewall), and helped create Flask architecture for integration of type enforcement into vanilla OS's. Flask was ported to Linux in SELinux project. That got enough acceptance that TrustedBSD project was started to do same for FreeBSD. So, full circle back the the OS the tech was first fielded on.
Nonetheless, the old stuff (esp LOCK & LOCK/ix) are still stronger in security architecture and design despite all these years. Good design is timeless I guess. :)
Note: Cambridge's CHERI project and CheriBSD are the cutting-edge for FreeBSD security as they do capability-security from hardware up with FreeBSD already ported. Also supports Capsicum, Flask, and separation kernels if one wanted. True integration of each major branch of INFOSEC. :)
Sounds like a demand problem rather than a FreeBSD problem. I've heard the same about SELinux etc with them overly permissive by default due to user apathy. I'd say Linux is ahead of usability of these controls, even supported by vendors like Tresys. It's also ahead in terms of risky code/tools a major distribution will support vs a major BSD. So, comparisons are a moving target.
Fortunately, the best security approaches (HW-centric) are portable to both w/ FreeBSD getting most prototypes. You can already run capability-secure FreeBSD via Cambridge CHERI project. Criswell's people are doing lots of stuff with FreeBSD and maybe Linux:
That doesn't even include software-related techniques like microkernels, low TCB software, safe low-level languages, and automatic compiler transformations for security that neither are adopting. They're both low-medium assurance by my standards due to cultural refusal to apply what's proven to work. So, I already have predictions about tech-transfer of papers above to Linux/FreeBSD use at large. You can probably guess how optimistic I am. ;)
how many people ever bother to write and deploy a trustedbsd policy: (to first order approximation) nobody
Defaults matter, a feature matrix checkbox is simply deceptive because the fact something isn't on (and configured) by default often means its an insane amount to work to try to enable it and/or thing are unfixably broken when you do (from a user point of view)
unfortunately both these things are true of trustedBSD