I used to live in Boston and visited recently for the first time in a while. The red line was so slow between Central Square and Harvard that I thought there must have been some kind of mechanical failure, but when I mentioned it to friends afterwards they said that it had been like that for months.
(Ignore my previous reply I found it myself). To be fair to the authors, it is not their primary specification, that was a linear probability model. The logit model is just a robustness check to make sure the linearity assumption isn't driving the results.
Yes, the primary specification was a linear probability model for the likelihood of a binary dependent variable conditioned on two binary input variables. As far as I could tell, the fit was max likelihood without regularization and the paper's bombshell conclusion was based on the regression coefficients' p-values.
The Stata thing was just one of many, many red flags.
Sorry to be pedantic, but although Monte Carlo simulations are based on pseudo-randomness, I still think it is good practice that they have deterministic results (i.e., use a given seed) so that the exact results can be replicated. If the precise numbers can be reproduced then a) it helps me as a reviewer see that everything is kosher with their code and b) it means that if I tweak the code to try something out my results will be fully compatible with theirs.
I sympathize with the author's disdain for brutalist and some deconstructivist work. But to suggest that all contemporary architecture is a movement towards creating deliberately alienating and impractical buildings, seems to me very wrong. I think Zaha Hadid's work (which the author critiques) is aesthetically pleasing to most people, not alienating, for example https://assets.newatlas.com/dims4/default/e09670a/2147483647... . The author expresses a uniform disdain for skyscrapers, but many skyscrapers are popular with the general public, for example, the Gherkin in London https://i.pinimg.com/474x/b5/78/c0/b578c0732b532b91b5e8455de... or say, The Empire State Building. Personally I do not find the shiny glass and sleek curves of many of these buildings unsettling or alienating nor, I think, do most people. In short, if we accept a basic premise of the author's: that what is good architecture is what is pleasing to most of the people who view and interact with it, then the author's critique is (I believe) too broad because many of the architects and buildings the author implicitly or explicitly criticizes are in fact popular.
Furthermore, something that the author does not address is the movement in contemporary architecture to carefully consider the practical effect of building design on the people within it. For example, how the flow of people is directed by the building, how the layout can help its occupants interact with each other, how interior walls can support privacy or erode it, and how to cater the response to these concerns to the function of the building. This is the opposite of the approach in Eisenman's house design mentioned in the article.
I admit I haven't read or even heard of Kate Raeworth, but I am an academic economist. Most modern economic research is empirical, a paper poses a policy-relevant empirical question 'did policy X reduce unemployment' and then empirical evidence is presented (perhaps using data from a randomly controlled trial or using quasi-experimental variation). The statistics are calculated and the assumptions required for the validity of the statistical analysis discussed critically and at great length. Undergraduate econ classes unfortunately leave students with the impression that academic econ is mostly unrealistic theoretical models of behavior, but those models are just handy tools for hypothesis formation, and it is the empirical testing of hypotheses that makes a discipline a science, not the manner by which those hypotheses were formed.
Hypothesis driven research disregarding rigoriousness of hypothesis formation is most often flawed, as the hypotheses will be filled with suspicious/flawed concepts that cannot serve as reliable and meaningful abstraction of reality.
Consider the measures prefixed with 'real', for example, 'real wage'. The concept of 'real wage' isn't meaningless, since it captures the relation between wage and purchasing power when inflation is involved. But what about cases where inflation is not involved, or cases where we need to consider interactions between some other factors and inflation? In those cases, the concept of 'real wage' is often impedimental and misleading, a ratio indicating purchasing power would surely be a better choice.
Consider the concept of 'equilibrium'. I can hardly see any empirical foundation of 'equilibrium' when it's invoked by empirical economics research. There are stationary periods of prices. But it's a different story to interpret such stationariness as a state of equilibrium with a mysterious process forcing prices to always gravitate to this state. This interpretation is without empirical foundation and yet its reliability is often assumed a priori in the research.
If you are not persuaded, it's okay. Regardless, I don't believe hypothesis formation is irrelevant.
EDIT: On second thought, my case against 'real wage' above was missing the key. The key is that purchasing power is what matters, and the purchasing power (most of the time local) of stock variables (e.g. savings) is what matters. To adjust flow variables by inflation is often misleading.
Well, at the very least, the argument over hypothesis formation is not specific to economics. The philosopher of science Karl Popper argued that science should aim to empirically falsify hypotheses, and that the way scientists develop those hypotheses, while an interesting psychological question, is irrelevant for the scientific method. He argued that hypothesis formation always contains an element of irrationality and instinct and he quotes Einstein who expressed views to that effect.
