Don't bother, for some, no matter what is true they'd prefer to live with some adverse abstraction to overcome; it provides unity, purpose, and a sense of importance.
Not really it's a common noun, which just means non-physical objects which exist in some way, even if Nominalist. You're confusing platonic with Platonic realism which are different things. But perhaps he should edit it to be more clear if the mistake is quite common, albeit perhaps meaning espoused by capitalization has been forgotten.
In German we do not have that distinction between the different capitalizations, at least not that I am aware of, and the usage of platonic is probably essentially limited to platonic love and relationships. Something learned about the subtleties of the English language.
We don't have that distinction in English, either. Words derived from names just tend to lose their capitalization over time and may gradually be diluted in meaning as people use them without understanding their origin.
But I do see how it could be confused with platonic love, albeit I'm comfortable using it without clarification in the appropriate contexts. You're right, in German all nouns are capitalized.
If you simply meant to say that the idea of Santa Claus obviously "exists" in some sense, thus it's valid to compare our experiences with that idea, then I agree with the comment saying a lot of people would agree with you, but "platonic" is ambiguous at best.
If you really did mean to imply that an ideal Santa Claus literally exists in a literal universe of perfect ideal forms, out of which everything in our universe emerges as an imperfect projection, then I agree with the other part of the comment saying you'll find much less agreement with that claim.
My comment was that the loss of capitalization and the loss of the word's original meaning are independent phenomena. I.e. the adjective "Platonic" is often being used in the diluted sense of "conceptual" or "mental image of", and that has nothing to do with capitalization.
>If you really did mean to imply that an ideal Santa Claus literally exists in a literal universe of perfect ideal forms
In philosophy, this is "Platonic Realism" quite different from "platonic", the lower case helps convey information. You make a mistake by assuming "platonic" explicitly conveys "Platonic Realism", given there are many "Platonic *" theories, such as "Platonic Idealism". Because of the ambiguity, as you correctly acknowledge, you are expected to understand it as the wikipedia article on "Platonic" suggests (as some sort of abstract object): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic
"Plato's influence on Western culture was so profound that several different concepts are linked by being called "Platonic" or Platonist, for accepting some assumptions of Platonism, but which do not imply acceptance of that philosophy as a whole."
I still tend to argue that the use of »platonic» or »Platonic« most of the time implies a relation to the philosophy of Plato, the usage with the generalized meaning of something along the line of »abstract« seems to be at least quite rare. The quote from Wikipedia also seems to support this.
And that is of course why I interpreted the combination of »platonic« and »Santa Claus« as hinting at Platonic Realism, because of the implied relation to the ideas of Plato and the example of »Santa Claus« as an abstract idea. Are there any other parts to his work were »Santa Claus« could be a relevant example but that is not related to his theory of ideal forms?
Also »Platonic Realism« and »Platonic Idealism« are, as far as I can tell, the same thing. »Platonic Realism« seems to be the common term, »Platonic Idealism« seems to be a less frequently used term with its origin in the fact that Plato called his abstract objects ideal forms.
"Plato's influence on Western culture was so profound that several different concepts are linked by being called "Platonic" or Platonist, for accepting some assumptions of Platonism, but which do not imply acceptance of that philosophy as a whole."
Does not support that the "Platonic" is Platonic Realism, which is what your chief claim is and what it would implicate if the term conveyed acceptance of the entire philosophy. It merely means the acceptance of an ontology of abstractions—which is implicit when there is discussion of it, otherwise how would it be discussed?
Even if you believe Platonic Idealism and Realism are the same (which is usually meant to designate the classification between 'soft' and 'hard' Platonism), there are even different Platonic periods.
Nonetheless, it's clear that I didn't communicate this well if I'm in this conversation. Which I don't think is irrational since my discussions are usually restricted to academic contexts where this usage is ostensibly vernacular.
Wholly irrelevant, the paper is specifically concerned with recovering a dialectic between W. O. Quine and M. Dummett. Even if the question was the more general, "Is Logic Metaphysics?", knowledge of formal logics isn't even of concern. It's trivial that we can construct a plethora of axioms with their own definitions, the problem remains: to even adhere to those definitions one is exercising another intuitive logic—even in the case of computation which is an engineered construction to proxy this very intuition, otherwise we would have never been concerned with the linear properties necessary for computation to begin with.
The experience of truth and logical consistency is entirely subjective. We can build networks of concepts that trigger the experience in ourselves and in others, but that doesn't make them objectively true - it makes them subjectively persistent and shared.
We acquired a cat recently, and it's interesting that her experience of basic spatial relationships is very different to ours.
She doesn't have the same experience of physics that we do. She sometimes gets confused by inside vs outside, and her experience of moving objects seems to be different to ours. She also gives the impression of experiencing hands and feet as disconnected objects, and not part of a gestalt "human".
We have no guarantees that from an alien point of view, our own experience of physics and of relationships doesn't have equivalent limitations. If the limitations exist, we're not aware of them. But to the extent that our cat's view of the world is probably recognisable by other cats, she's not aware of her limitations either.
It's more of a stretch, but not impossible, that our experience of logical abstraction and consistency may also have limitations. There may be non-human viewpoints where the basic subjective qualia of truth and consistency are more coherent, reliable, and inclusive than our own.
None of this can be proved, but it seems optimistic to me to believe that our version of logic is as good as logic can possibly be.
Yet we're able to discuss topics with each other, this is the basis of Poincare's Inter-subjective reality. There must be some commonalities of experience which allows us to map our whole experiences between each other. We are definitively limited to our experience, it is impossible to discuss or probe anything outside of it when the entire world and its phenomena is only dictated through experience to us.
Experience is a language which makes meaning from the not-experience.
As Bohr put it, "We're all suspended in language."
What I'm saying is that linear logic is exactly a technical exploration directly pertinent to the questions Quine and Dummett considered. And who cares if the paper is specifically about Quine and Dummett? What's the point of resuscitating such a dialogue without informing it of modern developments? To do so seems like frolicking in the graveyard. But much like philosophy of mathematics (with some exceptions like [0]), philosophy of logic to me at least seems like it prefers dusty bones to fresh developments (if 40 years is fresh...). At the very least, modern logic and its myriad connections to other fields could shed light on whether it's even worth bothering to adjudicate the interplay of Quine and Dummet's metaphysical arguments. They might be completely irrelevant at this point in our understanding except as historical footnotes.
Linear logic is in many ways a logic of logic. Both classical and intuitionistic logic can be decomposed into finer components in linear logic, which distills logical ideas into purer components of philosophical interest, like the exponentials. The links between linear logic and processes like computation makes it a much more interesting starting point for a discussion of metaphysics and logic: Its technical results tell us that not every bespoke Broccoli logic makes sense, that one can directly study the conditions of possibility of logic. It even has connections to fundamental physics [1].
> It's trivial that we can construct a plethora of axioms with their own definitions, the problem remains: to even adhere to those definitions one is exercising another intuitive logic—even in the case of computation which is an engineered construction to proxy this very intuition, otherwise we would have never been concerned with the linear properties necessary for computation to begin with.
How are we to investigate this intuitive logic without probing the technical structure of logic and finding out what is really its essence? It's not, emphatically not trivial that one can cook up a bunch of axioms. Logic doesn't come from axioms, I think we agree about that, they are just an exigent way to surface it. There are most definitely inappropriate formulations of logic. For example, S4 is an OK modal logic of necessity and possibility but S5 is hardly a logic at all because it doesn't have cut elimination, the technical correlate of deduction.
I think this attitude just serves to marginalize philosophy of logic. Technique and philosophy must be in dialogue or both will be marginalized.
The author cares about that, it's his abstract. In the same way a scientist would care about the precision and conclusions of results obtained from an older study--you are forced to use the original researchers had. Of course you can verify it with new tools, but what's the point if the research is systemically flawed to begin with?
The childhood quote hammered into our ears continues to ring true: "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants."- Newton
I agree that newer technical formal languages describing our own methods of sound predicate are useful, but that's excessive and even pretentious in this case. Would you use quantum computation to verify the result of addition on a classical computer? It adds nothing, especially when it is quantum computation that is being construed to emulate classical computation!
>How are we to investigate this intuitive logic without probing the technical structure of logic and finding out what is really its essence?
Its essence cannot be discovered, there are "exigent way[s] to surface it", but like experience, it's atomic. In the end the models will just become more comprehensive in terms of formalizing experience. Yet the experience of logic is the essence; how are you able to describe what makes up experience in terms of experience? If this is the purpose of these "tools" (it's not) then they ought not to be limited by objects of human experience, as the noumenon (the negation of experience) is not even guaranteed to be symbolic to objects of perception—by definition they are not.
I would be flummoxed to find fundamental physics constructed, described, and extended from axioms through logic had no connection with logic.
Philosophy of logic continues to discuss other logics, it is only that this particular article that it's of no concern to.
It doesn't have to be explained why, it is. The why would be a separate question requiring reasoning. Things can be true without an explanation as to why they happen. It's not an assumption as experience is not a choice, in fact experience is a prerequisite to then be able to assume (as well as to reason).
He is specifically talking about blocking web traffic, "The answer to the first is we're not sure", not fast lanes. Repealing NN will do that, every time you have regulations you have to hire another team of lawyers and accountants; which only large corporations can afford––it's just another barrier of entry to market.
The barriers to entry in the ISP market right now are the large corporations, which keep doing adorable things like suing would-be municipal competitors out of existence. The claim that regulation is the problem here, rather than a matter of mere ideological opposition, is a claim desperately in need of some kind of substantiation. And the idea of empowering oligopolists even further, by relaxing restrictions designed to prevent them engaging in rentiership, is an idea in desperate need of anything concrete to show it's worth implementing.
He was asked two questions then began his response with “the answer to the first is”, I think it’s much more reasonable to interpret that as the first question.
Except we have seen cases of blocking before in the US, so even by that interpretation he's misleading people: in 2005, North Carolina-based ISP (and phone company) Madison River blocked customers from using Vonage. More recently, Verizon blocked its customers from installing Google Wallet on their phones and AT&T tried to block its customers from using Skype on iPhones...
I hate to be an apologist, but you're the only one who is mistaken here, he specifically is talking about the blocking of web traffic not fast lanes: "The answer to the first is we're not sure".
