The CPU will likely have a clock speed around 100Mhz, far slower than the 1.5Ghz 64bit cores on the VisionFive 2 or Pi4. The FPGA might still be useful if you want to customize the CPU or integrate other custom hardware.
M5Stack is an AWS partner for a new “AWS IoT EduKit” so I imagine you will be seeing more projects using them in IoT roles. The getting started guide has some examples.
Can you identify a time when cost was obviously a signifcant factor in a military choice? To me it seems that cost is low in the grand scheme of things.
If they could have 1,000 asat sats, they'd want to have 1,000. Can you imagine them saying "sure, let's just have an X-37B, one, just one, it will do"? If you need these in a shooting war, 1 ain't gonna be enough. You need lots of them. You can't have lots of them if: they're big and heavy (launches are too infrequent and too expensive) or if they're too expensive (you want 1,000 but can only afford 10).
What I was told is that if you research the patent and aware of its existence then you may be guilty of willful enfringement with treble the normal penalties:
More precisely, a standing policy that researching patents is forbidden is prima facie evidence that your employees couldn't have possibly known about an existing patent. That means that a plaintiff suing for willful infringement will need to find evidence that someone went out of their way to ignore the policy. That might be quite difficult.
(Of course: not a lawyer, this is not legal advice)
Wow, I'm amazed that this would hold up. That's like saying that if I drive with a blindfold on, I couldn't possibly have willfully caused an accident because, as a matter of policy, I couldn't have been aware of the other cars on the road.
My reading of this is that the ex-employee used the knowledge about EC2 instance credentials being accessible as a path to gain unauthorized access to data. In theory anyone could have exploited this vulnerability even if they had never worked for Amazon. They never say that Amazon employees had privileged credentaials that would give them unauthorized access to customer data.
There was zero inside knowledge and they were an ex employee at all times relevant to the incident.
The EC2 instance credentials via the metadata url is public documented functionality. Its how things like the SDK “just work.”
The S3 bucket policy, instance creds, and (inferred) overly permissive IAM policy is all public documented functionality. This looks like a simple case of an initial intrusion being escalated via permissive configuration and controls. There would be no story if the suspect had not been employed by AWS in the past.
Disclaimer: Im a Principal jn AWS but have no direct or inside knowledge of this incident. Everything I know or have stated here is public record (eg the indictment) or public AWS docs.
