This thesis is absurd. Who gives a shit where the poster's identifier sits? No one. It's all about the feed.
Instagram's feed is full of bullshit that has nothing to do with anyone I follow. It's a conduit for spam at this point, and everyone knows it.
TikTok on the other hand is just a sewer line. I don't know what dictates the effluent they're funneling through anyone's feed, but it represents a new low even to cynics. Just... mind-boggling stupidity.
Vine came and went. So why the ascendance of TikTok? Human stupidity. My condolences to Vine's creators.
This is a pretty cool prototype for something I'd considered Godot for: a GUI for a device running embedded Linux. In that environment, you want the least bloat but some decent development tools so you can iterate reasonably fast. That's not a widely-available combo.
Does the "pattern matching" referred to here work like JavaScript's "destructuring?" It's the thing where you can call a function with an object, but the function's parameters extract one or more of the object's members directly without mentioning the object's class, so it'll take anything that has appropriately named members.
no, pattern matching is more like destructuring AS CONDITIONS (eg: if object has this structure) of switch blocks. While destructuring is simply sugar for assignment, pattern matching is more complex. I don't know about Java but in some languages you can customize the pattern so that it is not neccessarily in the actual shape of the object. In some languages applying pattern matching at the top level of the function is the equivalence of overloading.
Thanks! Intuitively this sounds like it enables what at one time would have been called bad programming (widespread reliance on RTTI), but on the other hand a lot of rules have turned out to be arbitrary.
In this context it is referring to a specific product called "Personal Computer" made by IBM.
Just like when someone says they bought a record on compact disc, they are referring to Red Book Compact Disc Digital Audio Standard. They're not referring to any other discs that are small.
Ha haaa! NO, I have a decent-sized 45 collection and there's no confusion about their awesomeness! Most of them sound better than the dynamically-compressed-to-shit streaming "remasters" of the same songs today.
I also have a few 3-inch CDs, which were supposed to be the successor to 45s but record companies just weren't down for seriously selling singles at that point.
Another historical curiosity: I have a couple of "video CDs," which were regular-sized (5-inch) CDs with a digital section containing the song (playable on any CD player) and then an analog video section with the video for the song (playable on later LaserDisc players).
> Another historical curiosity: I have a couple of "video CDs," which were regular-sized (5-inch) CDs with a digital section containing the song (playable on any CD player) and then an analog video section with the video for the song (playable on later LaserDisc players).
That is a "CD Video" or "CD+V", which supported up to 20 minutes of CD audio and around 5 minutes of LaserDisc-style analog video. There was also a variant that skipped the CD audio and was just LaserDisc video on a CD-size disc called "Video Single Disc".
"Video CD" or "VCD" was a later all digital format that used MPEG-1 compression while also disabling error correction for more data capacity to fit more or less the same amount of VHS-ish quality video on a given disc as it could support CD audio. VCD never even reached the level of success of LaserDisc in the US but most standalone DVD players could play them. I believe they were a lot more popular in parts of Asia.
Fair enough; I didn't go hunting around for my discs to check the order of "video" and "CD" in the moniker.
"Video-CD" was widely used in China long after DVDs came out, lasting almost until the HD era (when the Chinese attempted to introduce their own HD disc format that still used a red (insert "communist" wisecrack here) laser.
I always thought that those Chinese discs were CD-I, which failed miserably in... well, everywhere else. But in fact CD-I was a bastardization of Video CD that was incompatible, although it offered slightly higher (but still crappy) resolution. In the end, the format that prevailed all those years in the east was presumably Video-CD.
Oh yeah, I have a few examples of yet another obscure disc variation: the 8-inch LaserDisc. If I remember correctly, I have "I Want to Break Free" and "Radio Ga-Ga" by Queen, and "Salt in My Tears" by Martin Briley. The back sides of those are opaque white plastic.
> Fair enough; I didn't go hunting around for my discs to check the order of "video" and "CD" in the moniker.
Yeah, sorry, I forget how to people sometimes. Just a nerd who burned a LOT of VCDs back when DVD burners were expensive yet DVD players that read VCDs were cheap so it's one of those details buried in my brain that just came out.
The problem was not really the software in isolation, but that pilots expected the 737 NG to behave exactly like the old version - because Boeing decided it was too expensive to retrain pilots.
The problem was software that prioritized input from a fauly external sensor, over pilot control, and literally crashed planes directly into the ground. At a certain step in the sequence it was not physically possible for a pilot to pull hard enough on the control element to counteract the software. Could they have disabled the system? Only if they could figure out the specific software trying to crash the plane.
Is that what you meant by "the problem wasn't the software?" Because the pilots should have been trained to unplug the computer to stop it from crashing the plane?
Pilots should (are supposed to) disable the auto-trim if it's doing something uncommanded/unexpected. Runaway trim can happen for reasons other than faulty software. MCAS was a new factor and they should have been told about it, I don't dispute that at all.
Here we are again, this misconception just won't die.
In the 737 MAX, the only way to disable auto-trim also disables powered trim (the thumb buttons). As grand parent says, at a certain step in the sequence it was not physically possible for a pilot to trim the plain back to stability manually. It simply can't be done.
In the 737 ng, there was a button to do just that. That would have been useful.
And that's even ignoring the fact that all symptoms were very different from those present in a runaway trim situation as described in the manual and learned by the pilots.
The thumb buttons would override MCAS. But then you'd have to disable the trim motors and trim manually (by hand-cranking a wheel). That part was not clearly understood by the pilots, because they were not told about MCAS.
How are pilots expected to disable a malfunctioning MCAS in an emergency, and balance manually by trial and error the aerodynamic extravagances of the angle of attack of such unbalanced aircraft in the middle of procedures?
The user of the parent comment is remarking about time.
The aircraft can be certified without MCAS?
By what I read, MCAS is there for to avoid entering into an aerodynamic stall when the aircraft is approaching a high angle of attack, due it's using larger motors for what classical 737 was designed for. It's balancing an unbalanced aircraft using software to repeatedly adjust the horizontal stabilizer.
It is not my field, but I'm not even sure if it should be called to trim, it sounds like a euphemism for what's going on.
The manufacturer company put in larger engines than the aircraft is designed for. And they did it to avoid all the homologation licences and design costs involved in bringing a new aircraft to market with the appropriate tolerances, and to compete with another company's aircraft in time (Loss of sales).
They introduced MCAS in the aircraft for to balance by software a hardware issue, a big design negligent issue which can lead to stalling. It is beyond to trim an aircraft, and because of this there is a big difference in the scale of the values that the algorithm manages from a trimming.
It is not my field, but I think it is not a simple factor, and that it should not be put this over the Pilots like if it were a normal aircraft that received a simple update. Every pilot flying that plane should have been warned that it was not a classic plane with a classic update.
If this type of behaviour by aircraft manufacturers becomes the norm, costs over safety, we as passengers will suffer it, as other passengers unfortunately suffered it, while they blame the Pilots. In addition that nowadays the China's aircraft manufacturing industry wants to enter global market. Some days ago I read they want permission (homologations approvals) for to enter in the European Union.
PS: They also cut costs retiring backup sensors, delegating responsibility for a vital system due the MCAS to the buyer as if it was an unimportant feature; disaster was the order of the day. And the spending cuts were not limited to that, as we have seen in recent days.
> They introduced MCAS in the aircraft for to balance by software a hardware issue, a big design negligent issue which can lead to stalling.
> Every pilot flying that plane should have been warned that it was not a classic plane with a classic update.
I was mean,
> They introduced MCAS to use software to attempt to balance an aerodynamically unbalanced aircraft with a high stall tendency, in order to avoid designing a new aircraft.
> Any pilot flying that aircraft should have been warned that it was a plane that didn't want to fly aerodynamically, with software forcing it to fly without backed redundancy. It was not mere trimming.
Even more ridiculous, Boeing offered a second source of truth option, but marked it as an upcharge, which the airlines in question rejected. "No thanks, no need for a second AoA sensor, one is none is probably fine!"
Additionally, two feels like a really strange number. I would think three for a tiebreaker would be standard for any sensor with that much impact (no pun intended).
Yes, two would be very ill-advised. I think there was some incident where a plane had only two pitot tubes and of course this caused problems. Or... I may have simply misremembered pitot tubes instead of AOA sensors in the Boeing case.
This wasn’t related to autopilot and they removed mention of the MCAS system from the documentation to support the main selling point of the 737 MAX, which was that existing 737 pilots would be able to switch easily without recertification. They knew that they’d lose most sales to Airbus if the aircraft were compared on their merits so they were banking hard on their huge pool of certified pilots as the competitive edge.
If you listen to podcasts, these two episodes of Causality are excellent:
Ha, playing hardball! I wonder whether you’d find pilots who are Boeing loyalists who’d take offense, or if those guys are even madder at the current management for letting them down.
>> Because the pilots should have been trained to unplug the computer to stop it from crashing the plane?
Yes.
The fault lies with the airlines because I don't for a second believe they didn't put pressure on Boeing to get the MAX certified without mandating retraining.
And then once that was done, didn't dig into the details too hard about what changes were made.
I have a low tolerance for 'I set up all the conditions and incentives to encourage you to break the law... but you should take all the blame when it explodes.'
At some point, the customer has to take some responsibility for what they asked for.
It’s easier to blame Boeing because they made the damn thing its documentation. We know for a fact they are at fault. Some or all of the airlines may or may not have put pressure on Boeing.
The expense for retraining pilots falls on the airline.
Retraining has its own problems. No matter how well retraining is done, pilots still make mistakes from doing the right thing for the previous plane that is the wrong thing for the one they are currently flying.
Adjusting airplanes to fly the same way is a major safety advantage.
Arguably, Boeing hit the uncanny safety valley -- similar enough so that pilots and airlines relaxed, but different enough so that relaxation ultimately killed people.
The emergency procedure for runaway trim was the same for both aircraft types, and was not followed. After the first crash, an Emergency Airworthiness Directive was issued to all MAX pilots reiterating the procedure, which was not followed in the second crash, as well as not reacting to an overspeed warning.
Unreported by the media, there was another MAX incident before the first crash. The crew had no knowledge of MCAS, but did follow the emergency runaway trim procedure, and continued the flight and landed safely.
"Runaway stab trim". It is a memory item, every pilot should be able to perform it from memory.
Turn off the motor, and the trim is manual. There is a crank right there in the cockpit. If it is too hard to turn, change aircraft configuration to reduce the forces required to. Pilot know how to do this. This pilot stuff, they understand the forces on the flight controls and what impacts them.
Boeing made an engineering mistake. The pilots also made an operational mistake. Unfortunately, both mistakes at the same time were fatal.
I pray that pilot training has improved. And that Boeing has made systems level changes to the aircraft that will preclude it happening in the future.
And that is how aviation becomes safer every year; at a significant cost of customers lives.
> The probable cause of this accident was the inappropriate response by the first officer as the pilot flying to an inadvertent activation of the go-around mode, which led to his spatial disorientation and nose-down control inputs that placed the airplane in a steep descent from which the crew did not recover.
The fatal accident count is higher for GA, but I didn't normalize against flight hours or flights, just glanced at it.
I'm sure there's been a study somewhere that attempts to untangle all the factors that differ between commercial carriers and GA, to see which safety is most sensitive to -- continuous highly professional maintenance, highly trained and experienced crew, rigorous airliner certification regime, etc.
The electric trim switches override MCAS. This was explained in the Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots after the first crash.
Also, overspeeding the airplane makes it much harder to turn the manual trim wheel. The cockpit voice recorder on the EA flight recorded the overspeed warning horn, which the crew did nothing about (they were at full power, should have pulled the throttles back).
The LA crew restored normal trim twenty-five times before crashing. What they never did was turn it off after restoring normal trim.
If a pilot can't be expected to maintain the pitch of a plane on takeoff, he has no business flying ANYTHING.
What Boeing did (and is STILL doing) is expect pilots to know or remember obscure NON-PILOTAGE (and in the case of MCAS, BURIED) trivia to prevent disaster.
Now... what's the more-responsible approach? Expect pilots to pilot, or expect them to recall an ever-growing list of workarounds to incompetent system design?
The whole MCAS was just unnecessary feature (bug fix).
Without it the plane would have worked just fine. The pilots would just have had to go some amount of training scenarios to get the certification on how the MAX plain flies.
Exactly. Unless the "upward-pitching tendency" under high power is extreme, any competent pilot should be able to keep the plane's attitude as desired.
Instagram's feed is full of bullshit that has nothing to do with anyone I follow. It's a conduit for spam at this point, and everyone knows it.
TikTok on the other hand is just a sewer line. I don't know what dictates the effluent they're funneling through anyone's feed, but it represents a new low even to cynics. Just... mind-boggling stupidity.
Vine came and went. So why the ascendance of TikTok? Human stupidity. My condolences to Vine's creators.