While DAOS looks cool, from their roadmap it looks like they still don't have a fault domain larger than a server... Their erasure coding profiles also look pretty thin. I'm ex-Meta, our infra had vastly different availability and reliability requirements but that looks like it'd be painful to support at scale.
You can shrink XFS, but only the realtime volume. All you need is xfs_db and a steady hand. I once had to pull this off for a shortened test program for a new server platform at Meta. Works great except some of those filesystems did somehow get this weird corruption around used space tracking that xfs_repair couldn't detect... It was mostly fine.
Personally what stands out to me for 3FS isn't just that it has a FUSE client, but that they made it more of a hybrid of FUSE client and native IO path. You open the file just like normal but once you have a fd you use their native library to do the actual IO. You still need to adapt whatever AI training code to use 3FS natively if you want to avoid FUSE overhead, but now you use your FUSE client for all the metadata operations that the native client would have needed to implement.
If you already know the checksum for some huge chunk of the message then you don't need to recompute it to append some data and get a new checksum (at least for CRC). On the read side you would want to have checksums at whatever granularity you want to be able to read but for a larger combined CRC checksum you don't need to ever reread data to append or prepend to it.
Wifi would probably be the easiest. Either hide a dummy AP in the house or use a combination of multiple neighbors APs. If you don't see any beacon frames from the dummy SSID for a 30 second period then lock/shred the computer.
Wifi 5/6 sometimes rake up to a couple of minutes to get online (DFS and whatever) so 30 seconds is like smoking near an open can of gasoline: mostly fine but when it's not...
iMessage is not on the same playing field as Whatsapp and Signal. Apple has full control over key distribution and virtually no one verifies Apple isn't acting as a MitM. Whatsapp and e2e encrypted messenger force you to handle securely linking multiple devices to your account and gives you the option to verify that Meta isn't providing bogus public keys to break the e2e encryption.
For iMessage, Apple can just add a fake iDevice to your account and now iMessage will happily encrypt everything to that new key as well and there's zero practical visibility to the user. If it was a targeted attack and not blanket surveillance then there's no way the target is going to notice. You can open up the keychain app and check for yourself but unless you regularly do this and compare the keys between all your Apple products you can't be sure. I don't even know how to do that on iPhone.
Are you talking about Brian Steel? He was held in contempt because he refused to name his source that informed him of some misconduct by the judge (ex parte communication with a witness). That's hardly relevant here, the client wasn't involved at all as far as anyone knows.
