What's funny to me is that, not only is this also how the financial industry is structured, but that a) this is the currently fashionable means of reducing risk and b) it is seen as a feature not a bug.
Citation: Any book about the 2008 financial crisis, or the 1998 crisis, or the 1987 crisis, e.g.
[0] 'The Quants', Scott Patterson
[1] 'When Genius Failed', Lowenstein.
[2] 'Demon of Our Own Design', Richard Bookstaber.
Check out Alex Miller's Data Replication Design Spectrum for what you might use instead of Raft (for replication specifically), or what tweaks you might make to Raft for better throughput or space efficiency (for replication).
After 10 years in defense tech, watching missile attacks in Ukraine and the Middle East made it clear how little most people really get about air defense. So I'm builiding this simulator which drops you into the operator’s seat. You can test out different scenarios and build an air defense network against various types of threats (stats from real world). Also have Ukraine, Israel-Iran scenarios.
What users want, and what they collectively consume, are two different things. This is very evident in the AAA games industry, which is facing a 10x downturn in funding, abysmally bad (negative) ROI, and exhausted growth engines because it shaped itself around what players would consume for years, ignoring what they actually wanted. And the players got tired[0].
It turns out that demand matters when you sell a product or a service. And it is elastic in ways other than price (such as convenience, value, appeal), but not infinitely so. In plain English, you can force anti-social media onto the market by making it appealing/hooking/addictive/convenient/supposedly valuable for a while, but not indefinitely. People do demand proper socializing, especially recently. Many are realizing they've been sold a total bag of goods just because they consumed it, and it's not good enough to displace real human connection.
Admiral Rickover was likely the single most competent engineering manager in the last century and wrote this: Doing a Jobhttps://govleaders.org/rickover.htm
Complex jobs cannot be accomplished effectively with transients. Therefore, a manager must make the work challenging and rewarding so that his people will remain with the organization for many years. This allows it to benefit fully from their knowledge, experience, and corporate memory.
The Defense Department does not recognize the need for continuity in important jobs. It rotates officer every few years both at headquarters and in the field. The same applies to their civilian superiors.
This system virtually ensures inexperience and nonaccountability. By the time an officer has begun to learn a job, it is time for him to rotate. Under this system, incumbents can blame their problems on predecessors. They are assigned to another job before the results of their work become evident. Subordinates cannot be expected to remain committed to a job and perform effectively when they are continuously adapting to a new job or to a new boss.
When doing a job—any job—one must feel that he owns it, and act as though he will remain in the job forever. He must look after his work just as conscientiously, as though it were his own business and his own money. If he feels he is only a temporary custodian, or that the job is just a stepping stone to a higher position, his actions will not take into account the long-term interests of the organization. His lack of commitment to the present job will be perceived by those who work for him, and they, likewise, will tend not to care. Too many spend their entire working lives looking for their next job. When one feels he owns his present job and acts that way, he need have no concern about his next job.
Rickover would be a savage critic of society and American culture as it is now, he even was then. He was a man who successfully challenged people in power, which is why I imagine most people never hear of him. He won many political battles, but the same people he challenged remained in power. When they wrote the history books, they diminish his legacy, because they don't want stories of people successfully challenging power structures and especially not stories of people who challeneged corporate power, or prove that the government can do something better, cheaper, and more dangerous/complicated than corporations.
And who knows what deeper layers of hell we avoided.
Frankly, VSCode shows that all this time people were complaining about no comments in JSON config and how hard it was to write config in JSON, they could have just written their apps to strip comments at read time.
> Semi-NCA hadn't even been published yet and seems like the clear choice nowadays[.]
For those who are awkwardly lingering and casting longing glasses at the entrance door of compiler engineering like I am, and who were just as dismayed by this sentence, it wasn’t “properly” published but looks to have been described in a thesis from 2005[1] and in an extended abstract (ugh) before that[2].
But also, the reduction of RMQ to NCA, really?.. Ouch. I’m having flashbacks to my (very brief) competitive programming days, and not the good kind.
> The book was written partly as a response to the misrepresented but increasingly commonplace idea of the "10,000-hour rule," popularized by Malcolm Gladwell in his 2008 book Outliers and which Gladwell had based on Ericsson's own research.
Citation: Any book about the 2008 financial crisis, or the 1998 crisis, or the 1987 crisis, e.g.
[0] 'The Quants', Scott Patterson
[1] 'When Genius Failed', Lowenstein.
[2] 'Demon of Our Own Design', Richard Bookstaber.