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A lot of the problem seems to be in making practical PQC algorithms. There are a few algorithms that have provable security guarantees (at least as I understand it), such as McEliece. Somewhat hilarious McEliece is actually faster than existing DLP systems. The problem is that the key size is very large, enough to make it impractical in the real world.

There are also systems like learning with errors. shortest vector, ... but I don't understand them well enough to know if they've been proven safe at a basic technique level.

The problem is that there have been many attempts to reduce the actual key size, and they keep being found to have ended up breaking the security of the underlying scheme.

I feel like that's what has happened here with rainbow.

(as a note to the "NSA conspiracy" folk: The NSA or what have you wants schemes that they can break by knowing some secret value. Schemes that simply break outright aren't useful to them because it means (1) anyone can break it, and (2) as a byproduct of (1) they cannot use it safely. In an ideal world what they want is something so secure that they could use it for communication themselves - which would reduce suspicion - but also be able to decrypt everything)




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